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298 
Executive Summary 299 
 300 
The Lancet Countdown tracks progress on the relationships between human health and climate 301 
change, providing an independent assessment of global progress to implement the Paris Agreement, 302 
and the health implications of these actions. 303 
It follows on from the work of the 2015 Lancet Commission, which concluded that anthropogenic 304 
climate change threatens to undermine the last 50 years of gains in public health, and conversely, 305 
that a comprehensive response to climate change could be “the greatest global health opportunity 306 
of the 21st century”.  307 
The Lancet Countdown exists as a collaboration between 24 academic institutions and inter-308 
governmental organisations, based in every continent, and with representation from a wide range of 309 
disciplines, including: climate scientists, ecologists, economists, engineers, experts in energy, food 310 
and transport systems, geographers, mathematicians, social and political scientists, public health 311 
professionals, and physicians. The collaboration reports annual indicators across five domains: 312 
climate change impacts, exposures and vulnerability; adaptation planning and resilience for health; 313 
mitigation actions and health co-benefits; economics and finance; and public and political 314 
engagement.  315 
The 2017 key messages from its 40 indicators in its first annual report are summarised below. 316 
 317 
The human symptoms of climate change are unequivocal and potentially irreversible – affecting 318 
the health of populations around the world, today. Whilst these effects will disproportionately 319 
impact the most vulnerable in society, every community will be affected. 320 
The impacts of climate change are disproportionately affecting the health of vulnerable populations, 321 
and those in low- and middle-income countries. By undermining the social and environmental 322 
determinants that underpin good health, it exacerbates social, economic and demographic 323 
inequalities with the effects eventually felt by all populations. 324 
The evidence is clear that exposure to more frequent and intense heatwaves are increasing, with an 325 
estimated 125 million additional vulnerable adults exposed to heatwaves from 2000 to 2016 326 
(Indicator 1.2). Higher ambient temperatures have resulted in estimated reduction of 5.3% in labour 327 
productivity, globally, from 2000 to 2016 (Indicator 1.3). Taken as a whole, a 44% increase in 328 
weather-related disasters has been observed since 2000, with no clear upward or downward trend 329 
in the lethality of these extreme events (Indicator 1.4), potentially suggesting the beginning of an 330 
adaptive response to climate change. Yet, the impacts of climate change are projected to worsen 331 
over time, with current levels of adaptation becoming insufficient in the future.  The total value of 332 
economic losses that resulted from climate-related events has been increasing since 1990, and 333 
totalled $129 billion in 2016, with 99% of these losses in low-income countries uninsured (Indicator 334 
4.4). Additionally, over the longer-term, altered climatic conditions are contributing to growing 335 
vectorial capacity for the transmission of dengue fever by Aedes aegypti, reflecting an estimated 336 
9.4% increase since 1950 (Indicator 1.6). 337 
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If governments and the global health community do not learn from the past experience of HIV/AIDS 338 
and the recent outbreaks of Ebola and Zika virus, another slow response will result in an irreversible 339 
and unacceptable cost to human health. 340 
 341 
The delayed response to climate change over the past 25 years has jeopardised human life and 342 
livelihoods.  343 
Since the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) commenced global efforts to 344 
tackle climate change in 1992, most of the indicators tracked by the Lancet Countdown have either 345 
shown limited progress, particularly with regards to adaptation, or moved in the wrong direction, 346 
particularly in relation to mitigation. Most fundamentally, carbon emissions, and global 347 
temperatures, have continued to rise..  348 
A growing number of countries are assessing their vulnerabilities to climate change, and are 349 
increasingly developing adaptation and emergency preparedness plans, and providing climate 350 
information to health services (Indicators 2.1, 2.3-2.6). The same is seen at the city-level, with over 351 
449 cities around the world reporting having undertaken a climate change risk assessment (Indicator 352 
2.2). However, the coverage and adequacy of such measures in protecting against the growing risks 353 
of climate change to health remains uncertain. Indeed, health and health-related adaptation funding 354 
accounts for 4.6% and 13.3% of total global adaptation spending, respectively (Indicator 4.9). 355 
Whilst there has been some recent progress in strengthening health resilience to climate impacts, it 356 
is clear that adaptation to new climatic conditions can only protect up to a point; an analogy to 357 
human physiology is useful here. The human body can adapt to insults caused by a self-limiting 358 
minor illness with relative ease. However, where disease steadily worsens, positive feedback cycles 359 
and limits to adaptation are quickly reached. This is particularly true when many systems are 360 
affected, and where the failure of one system may impact on the function of another, as is the case 361 
for ‘multi-organ system failure’, or where the body has already been weakened through repeated 362 
previous diseases or exposures. The same is true for the health consequences of climate change. It 363 
acts as a threat multiplier, compounding many of the issues communities already face, and 364 
strengthening the correlation between multiple health risks, making them more likely to occur 365 
simultaneously. Indeed, it is not a ‘single system disease’, instead, often acting to compound existing 366 
pressures on housing, food and water security, poverty, and many of the determinants of good 367 
health. Adaptation has limits, and prevention is better than cure to prevent potentially irreversible 368 
effects of climate change. 369 
Progress in mitigating climate change since the signing of the UNFCCC has been limited across all 370 
sectors, with only modest improvements in carbon emission reduction from electricity generation. 371 
Whilst there are increasing levels of sustainable travel in Europe and some evidence of decline in 372 
dependence on private motor vehicles in cities in the USA and Australia, the situation is generally 373 
less favourable in cities in emerging economies (Indicator 3.7). This, and a slow transition away from 374 
highly-polluting forms of electricity generation, has yielded a modest improvement in air pollution in 375 
some urban centres. However, global population-weighted PM2.5 exposure has increased by 11.2% 376 
since 1990 and some 71.2% of the 2971 cities in the WHO air pollution database exceed 377 
recommendations of annual fine particulate matter exposure (Indicator 3.5). The strength and 378 
coverage of carbon pricing covers only 13.1% of global anthropogenic CO2 emissions, with the 379 
weighted average carbon price of these instruments at 8.81USD/tCO2e in 2017 (Indicator 4.7). 380 
Furthermore, responses to climate change have yet to fully take advantage of the health co-benefits 381 
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of mitigation and adaptation interventions, with action taken to-date only yielding modest 382 
improvements in human wellbeing. In part, this reflects a need for further evidence and research on 383 
these ancillary effects and the cost-savings available. However, it also reflects a need for more 384 
joined-up policymaking across health and non-health ministries of national governments. 385 
This delayed mitigation response puts the world on a ‘high-end’ emissions trajectory, resulting in 386 
global warming of between 2.6°C and 4.8°C of warming by the end of the century.  387 
 388 
The voice of the health profession is essential in driving forward progress on climate change and 389 
realising the health benefits of this response. 390 
This report, and previous Lancet Commissions, have argued that the health profession has not just 391 
the ability but the responsibility to act as public health advocates, communicating the threats and 392 
opportunities to the public and policymakers, and ensuring climate change is understood as being 393 
central to human wellbeing. 394 
There is evidence of growing attention to health and climate change in the media and in academic 395 
publications, with global newspaper coverage of the issue increasing 78% and the number of 396 
scientific papers more than tripling, since 2007 (Indicator 5.1.1 and 5.2). However, despite these 397 
positive examples, the 2017 indicators make it clear that further progress is urgently required. 398 
 399 
Whilst progress has historically been slow, the last five years have seen an accelerated response, 400 
and the transition to low-carbon electricity generation now appears inevitable, suggesting the 401 
beginning of a broader transformation. In 2017, momentum is building across a number of sectors, 402 
and the direction of travel is set, with clear and unprecedented opportunities for public health. 403 
In 2015, the Lancet Commission made 10 recommendations to governments, to accelerate action 404 
over the following five years. The Lancet Countdown’s 2017 indicators track against these 2015 405 
recommendations, with results suggesting that discernible progress has been made in many of these 406 
areas, breathing life into previously stagnant mitigation and adaptation efforts. Alongside the Paris 407 
Agreement, these provide reason to believe that a broader transformation is under way. 408 
Recommendation 1) Invest in climate change and public health research: since 2007, the number of 409 
scientific papers on health and climate change has more than trebled (Indicator 5.2). 410 
 411 
Recommendation 2) Scale-up financing for climate-resilient health systems: spending on health 412 
adaptation is currently at 4.63% (16.46 billion USD) of global adaptation spend; and in 2017, health 413 
adaptation from global development and climate financing mechanisms is at an all-time high – 414 
although absolute figures remain low (Indicators 4.9 and 4.10). 415 
 416 
Recommendation 3) Phase-out coal-fired power: In 2015, more renewable energy capacity (150GW) 417 
than fossil fuel capacity was added to the global energy mix. Overall, annual installed renewable 418 
generation capacity (almost 2000 GW) exceeds that for coal, with about 80% of this recently added 419 
renewable capacity located in China (Indicator 3.2). Whilst investment in coal capacity has increased 420 
since 2006, in 2016 this turned and declined substantially (Indicator 4.1) and several countries have 421 
now committed to phasing-out coal. 422 
 423 
Recommendation 4) Encourage a city-level low-carbon transition, reducing levels of urban pollution:  424 
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Despite historically modest progress over the last two decades, the transport sector is approaching a 425 
new threshold, with electric vehicles expected to reach cost-parity with their non-electric 426 
counterparts by 2018 – a phenomenon that was not expected to occur until 2030 (Indicator 3.6). 427 
 428 
Recommendation 6) Rapidly expand access to renewable energy, unlocking the substantial economic 429 
gains available from this transition: Every year since 2015, more renewable energy has been added 430 
to the global energy mix than all other sources, and in 2016, global employment in renewable energy 431 
reached 9.8 million, over one million more than are employed in fossil fuel extraction. The transition 432 
has become inevitable. However, in the same year, 1.2 billion people still did not have access to 433 
electricity, with 2.7 billion people relying on the burning of unsafe and unsustainable solid fuels 434 
(Indicators 3.3, 4.6 and 3.4). 435 
 436 
Recommendation 9) Agree and implement an international treaty which facilitates the transition to a 437 
low-carbon economy: In December 2015, 195 countries signed the Paris Agreement, which provides 438 
a framework for enhanced mitigation and adaptation, and pledges to keep the global mean 439 
temperature rise to “well below 2°C”. Going forward, a formal Health Work Programme within the 440 
UNFCCC would provide a clear and essential entry point for health professionals at the national 441 
level, ensuring that the implementation of the Paris Agreement maximises the health opportunities 442 
for populations around the world. 443 
 444 
Following the United States government’s announced intention to withdraw from the Paris 445 
Agreement, the global community has demonstrated overwhelming support for enhanced action on 446 
climate change, affirming clear political will and ambition to reach the treaty’s targets. The 447 
mitigation and adaptation interventions committed to under the Paris Agreement have 448 
overwhelmingly positive short- and long-term health benefits, but greater ambition is now essential. 449 
Whilst progress has been historically slow, there is evidence of a recent turning point, with 450 
transitions in sectors crucial to public health accelerating towards a low-carbon world. Whilst these 451 
efforts must be greatly accelerated and sustained over the coming decades in order meet these 452 
commitments, recent policy changes and the indicators presented here suggest that the direction of 453 
travel is set. 454 
From 2017 until 2030, the Lancet Countdown: Tracking Progress on Health and Climate Change will 455 
continue its work, reporting annually on progress implementing the commitments of the Paris 456 
Agreement, future commitments that build on them, and the health benefits that result.  457 
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Introduction 458 
Climate change has serious implications for our health, wellbeing, livelihoods and the structure of 459 
organised society. Its direct effects result from rising temperatures, and changes in the frequency 460 
and strength of storms, floods, droughts, and heatwaves – with physical and mental health 461 
consequences. Its impacts will also be mediated through less direct pathways, including changes in 462 
crop yields, the burden and distribution of infectious disease, and in climate-induced population 463 
displacement and violent conflict.1-3 Whilst many of these effects are already being experienced, 464 
their progression in the absence of climate change mitigation will greatly amplify existing global 465 
health challenges and inequalities.4  It threatens to undermine many of the social, economic and 466 
environmental drivers of health, which have contributed greatly to human progress. 467 
Urgent and substantial climate change mitigation will help to protect human health from the worst 468 
of these impacts, with a comprehensive and ambitious response to climate change potentially 469 
transforming the health of the world’s populations.4 The potential benefits and opportunities are 470 
enormous, including cleaning up the air of polluted cities, delivering more nutritious diets, ensuring 471 
energy, food and water security, and alleviating poverty and social and economic inequalities. 472 
Monitoring this transition – from threat to opportunity – is the central role of the Lancet 473 
Countdown: Tracking Progress on Health and Climate Change.5 The collaboration exists as a 474 
partnership of 24 academic institutions from every continent, and brings together individuals with a 475 
broad range of expertise across disciplines (including climate scientists, ecologists, mathematicians, 476 
geographers, engineers, energy, food, and transport experts, economists, social and political 477 
scientists, public health professionals, and physicians). The Lancet Countdown aims to track a series 478 
of indicators of progress, publishing an annual ‘health check’, from now until 2030, on the state of 479 
the climate, progress made in meeting global commitments under the Paris Agreement, and 480 
adapting and mitigating to climate change (Panel 1). The initiative was formed following the 2015 481 
Lancet Commission, which concluded that “tackling climate change could be the greatest global 482 
health opportunity of the 21st century”.4 It builds on, and reinforces, the work of the expanding 483 
group of researchers, health practitioners, national governments, and the World Health Organization 484 
(WHO), who are working to ensure that this opportunity becomes a reality. 485 
 486 
Indicators of Progress on Health and Climate Change 487 
In 2016, the Lancet Countdown proposed a set of potential indicators to be monitored, launching a 488 
global consultation to define a conclusive set for 2017.5 A number of factors determined the 489 
selection of indicators, including: (i) their relevance to public health, both in terms of the impacts of 490 
climate change on health, and the health effects of the response to climate change; (ii) their 491 
relevance to the main anthropogenic drivers of climate change; (iii) their geographical coverage and 492 
relevance to a broad range of countries and income-groups; (iv) data availability; and (v) resource 493 
and timing constraints. Table 1 divides these into broad themes, aligned with the global action 494 
agenda on climate change and health, agreed at the Second WHO Global Conference on Health and 495 
Climate, Paris, July 2016: climate change impacts, exposures, and vulnerabilities; adaptation 496 
planning and resilience for health; mitigation actions and health co-benefits; economics and finance; 497 
and public and political engagement.6 498 
Panel 1 Developing Lancet Countdown’s Indicators: An Iterative and Open Process. 499 
The development of the Lancet Countdown’s indicators took a pragmatic approach, taking in to 500 
account the considerable limitations in data availability, resources, and time. Consequently, the 501 
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indicators presented here represent what is feasible for 2017 and will evolve over time in response 502 
to feedback and data improvements. 503 
The purpose of this collaboration is to track progress on the links between public health and climate 504 
change, and yet, much of the data analysed here was originally collected for purposes not directly 505 
relevant to health. Initial analysis therefore principally captures changes in exposure, states, or 506 
processes, as proxies for health outcomes – the ultimate goal. Employing new methodologies to 507 
improve attribution to climate change is a particular priority. Subsequent reports will see the Lancet 508 
Countdown set 2030 targets for its indicators which align more directly with the Paris Agreement, 509 
allowing an assessment of its implementation over the course of the next 13 years. 510 
The indicators presented thus far are the beginning of an ongoing, iterative and open process, which 511 
will work to continuously improve as capacity, data quality, and methods evolve. The objectives of 512 
the Lancet Countdown are both ambitious and essential, requiring support from a broad range of 513 
actors. To this end, the collaboration welcomes support from academic institutions and technical 514 
experts able to provide new analytical methods and novel data sets with appropriate geographical 515 
coverage. Appendix 1 provides a short overview of several parallel and complementary processes 516 
currently underway. 517 
Throughout this report, the results and analysis of each indicator are presented alongside a brief 518 
description of the data sources and methods. A more complete account of each indicator can be 519 
found in the corresponding appendices. For a number of areas – such as the mental health impacts 520 
of climate change, or hydrological mapping of flood exposure – a robust methodology for an annual 521 
indicator has not been reported, reflecting the complexity of the topic and the paucity of data, 522 
rather than its lack of importance. Table 1 provides a summary of the 2017 indicators, with a more 523 
complete overview of these indicators provided in the supplementary online material. The thematic 524 
groups and indicator titles provide an overview of the domain being tracked, allowing for the growth 525 
and development of these metrics – for example, to more directly capture health outcomes – in 526 
subsequent years. 527 
 528 
Thematic Group Indicators 
1. Climate Change 
Impacts, Exposures and 
Vulnerability 
1.1. Health effects of temperature change 
1.2. Health effects of heatwaves 
1.3. Change in labour capacity 
1.4. Lethality of weather-related disasters 
1.5. Global health trends in climate-sensitive diseases 
1.6. Climate-sensitive infectious diseases 
1.7. Food security 
and undernutrition 
1.7.1. Vulnerability to undernutrition 
1.7.2. Marine primary productivity  
1.8. Migration and population displacement 
2. Adaptation Planning 
and Resilience for Health 
2.1. National adaptation plans for health 
2.2. City-level climate change risk assessments 
2.3. Detection and early warning of, preparedness for, and response to health 
emergencies 
2.4. Climate information services for health 
2.5. National assessment of vulnerability, impacts and adaptation for health 
2.6. Climate-resilient health infrastructure 
3. Mitigation Actions and 
Health Co-Benefits 
3.1. Carbon intensity of the energy system 
3.2. Coal phase-out 
3.3. Zero-carbon emission electricity 
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3.4. Access to clean energy 
3.5. Exposure to 
ambient air 
pollution 
3.5.1. Exposure to air pollution in cities 
3.5.2. Sectoral contributions to air pollution 
3.5.3. Premature mortality from ambient air pollution by sector 
3.6. Clean fuel use for transport 
3.7. Sustainable travel infrastructure and uptake 
3.8. Ruminant meat for human consumption 
3.9. Healthcare sector emissions 
4. Economics and Finance 4.1. Investments in zero-carbon energy and energy efficiency 
4.2. Investment in coal capacity 
4.3. Funds divested from fossil fuels 
4.4. Economic losses due to climate-related extreme events 
4.5. Employment in low-carbon and high-carbon industries 
4.6. Fossil fuel subsidies 
4.7. Coverage and strength of carbon pricing 
4.8. Use of carbon pricing revenues 
4.9. Spending on adaptation for health and health-related activities 
4.10. Health adaptation funding from global climate financing mechanisms 
5. Public and Political 
Engagement 
5.1. Media 
coverage of 
health and 
climate change 
5.1.1. Global newspaper reporting on health and climate 
change 
5.1.2. In-depth analysis of newspaper coverage on health and 
climate change 
5.2. Health and climate change in scientific journals 
5.3. Health and climate change in the United Nations General Assembly 
Table 1 Thematic groups and indicators for the Lancet Countdown’s 2017 report. 529 
 530 
 531 
Delivering the Paris Agreement for Better Health 532 
The Paris Agreement has been ratified at the national level by 153 of 197 parties to the UNFCCC, and 533 
currently covers 84.7% of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. It set out a commitment of ambitious 534 
GHG emissions reduction to limit climate change to well below a global average temperature rise of 535 
2°C above pre-industrial levels, with an aim to limit temperature increases to 1.5°C.7  536 
Most countries (187) have committed to near-term GHG emission reduction actions up to 2030, 537 
through their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Article 4 paragraph 2 of the Paris 538 
Agreement states that each signatory “shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive 539 
nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve”.7 However, the NDCs of the 153 540 
parties that have ratified the agreement currently fall short of the necessary reductions by 2030 to 541 
meet the 2°C pathway.8 542 
The Lancet Countdown’s indicators place national decisions within a broader context. They highlight 543 
the fact that globally, total power capacity of ‘pre-construction’ coal (commitments for new coal 544 
power plants) has halved from 2016 to 2017 alone; that every year since 2015, more renewable 545 
energy has been added to the global energy mix than all other sources combined; its installed costs 546 
continue to fall (with solar photovoltaic (PV) electricity generation now being cheaper than 547 
conventional fossil fuels in an ever growing number of countries); electric vehicles are poised to 548 
reach cost-parity with their petrol-based counterparts; and in 2016 global employment in renewable 549 
energy reached 9.8 million, over one million greater than that in fossil fuel extraction. 550 
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These positive examples in recent years must not mask the dangerous consequences of failing to 551 
meet the Paris Agreement, the past two decades of relative inaction, the economies and sectors 552 
currently lagging behind, and the enormity of the task ahead, which leave achieving the Agreement’s 553 
aims in a precarious position. Indeed, much of the data presented should serve as a wake-up call to 554 
national governments, businesses, civil society, and the health profession. 555 
However, as this report demonstrates, the world has already begun to embark on a path to a low-556 
carbon and healthier world. Whilst the pace of action must greatly accelerate, the direction of travel 557 
is set.  558 
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1. Climate Change Impacts, Exposures and Vulnerability 559 
 560 
Introduction 561 
This section provides a set of indicators that track health impacts related to anthropogenic climate 562 
change. Such impacts are dependent upon the nature and scale of the hazard, the extent and nature 563 
of human exposure to them, and the underlying vulnerability of the exposed population.9 Thus, 564 
these indicators aim to measure exposure to climatic hazards and vulnerabilities of people to them, 565 
and over time, quantify the health impacts of climate change. These, in turn, inform protective 566 
adaptation and mitigation interventions (sections two and three), the economic and financial tools 567 
available to enable such responses (section four), and the public and political engagement that 568 
facilitates them (section five). 569 
Climate change affects human health primarily through three pathways: direct; ecosystem-570 
mediated; and human-institution-mediated.10 Direct effects are diverse, being mediated, for 571 
instance, by increases in the frequency, intensity, and duration of extreme heat, and by rises in 572 
average annual temperature experienced (leading to, for instance, increased heat-related mortality). 573 
Rising incidence of other extremes of weather, such as flood and storms, increase the risk of 574 
drowning and injury, damage to human settlements, the spread of water-borne disease, and mental 575 
health sequelae.10 Ecosystem-mediated impacts include changes in the distribution and burden of 576 
vector-borne diseases (such as malaria and dengue) and food and water-borne infectious disease. 577 
Human undernutrition from crop failure, population displacement from sea-level rise, and 578 
occupational health risks are examples of human-institution-mediated impacts.  579 
Whilst the literature, and indeed some of the data presented here has traditionally focused on 580 
impacts such as the spread of infectious diseases and mortality from extremes of weather, the 581 
health effects from non-communicable diseases are just as important. Mediated through a variety of 582 
pathways, they take the form of cardiovascular disease and acute and chronic respiratory disease 583 
from worsening air pollution and aero-allergens, or the often-unseen mental health effects of 584 
extreme weather events, or of population displacement.11,12 Indeed, emerging evidence is exploring 585 
links between a rising incidence of chronic kidney disease, dehydration, and climate change.13,14  586 
Eight indicators were selected and developed for this section: 587 
1.1 Health effects of temperature change 588 
1.2 Health effects of heatwaves 589 
1.3 Change in labour capacity 590 
1.4 Lethality of weather-related disasters 591 
1.5 Global health trends in climate-sensitive diseases 592 
1.6 Exposure to climate-sensitive infectious diseases 593 
1.7 Food security and undernutrition 594 
1.8 Migration and population displacement 595 
 596 
Appendix 2 provides a more detailed discussion on the data and methods used, as well as the 597 
limitations and challenges encountered in the selection of each indicator. The indirect indicators (1.5 598 
to 1.8) each provide a ’proof of concept’, rather than being fully comprehensive, focusing variably on 599 
a specific diseases, populations, or locations. Additionally, future iterations of the Lancet 600 
Countdown’s work will seek to capture indicators of the links between climate change and air 601 
pollution, and with mental ill-health.  602 
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Indicator 1.1: Health effects of temperature change 603 
Headline Finding: People experience far more than the global mean temperature rise. Between 2000 604 
and 2016, human exposure to warming was about 0.9oC - more than double the global area average 605 
temperature rise over the same period. 606 
Rising temperatures can exacerbate existing health problems among populations and also introduce 607 
new health threats (including cardiovascular disease and chronic kidney disease). The extent to 608 
which human populations are exposed to this change, and thus the health implications of 609 
temperature change, depend on the detailed spatial-temporal trends of population and temperature 610 
over time. 611 
Temperature anomalies were calculated relative to 1986 to 2008, from the European Research Area 612 
(ERA) produced by the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF).15 This 613 
dataset uses climate reanalysis to give a description of recent climate, produced by combining 614 
models with observations.16 The time series shown in Figure 1.1 are global mean temperatures 615 
calculated from the gridded data, weighted by area (to avoid bias from measurements near the 616 
poles) and by population (to show the number of people exposed); these are described as “area 617 
weighted” and “exposure weighted”, respectively.  618 
Changes in population were obtained per country and the data projected onto the gridded 619 
population.17 Figure 1.1 shows area- (yellow lines) and exposure-weighted (blue lines) changes in 620 
mean summer temperatures since 2000. Exposure-weighted warming from 2000 to 2016 (0.9oC) is 621 
much higher than the area-weighted warming (0.4oC) over the same period. Hence, mean exposure 622 
to warming is more than double the global warming since 2000. 623 
The increase in exposure relative to the global average is driven partly by growing population 624 
densities in India, parts of China and Sub-Saharan Africa. Accounting for population when assessing 625 
temperature change provides a vital insight into how human wellbeing is likely to be affected by 626 
temperature change, with the analysis here showing that temperature change where people are 627 
living is much higher than average global warming. Details of the global distribution of this warming 628 
can be found in Appendix 2. 629 
 630 
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 631 
Figure 1.1 Mean summer warming from 2000 to 2016 area weighted and exposure weighted, relative to the 632 
1986-2008 recent past average. 633 
 634 
Indicator 1.2: Health effects of heatwaves 635 
Headline Finding: Between 2000 and 2016, the number of vulnerable people exposed to heatwave 636 
events has increased by approximately 125 million, with a record 175 million more people exposed to 637 
heatwaves in 2015. 638 
The health impacts of extremes of heat range from direct heat stress and heat stroke, through to 639 
exacerbations of pre-existing heart failure, and even an increased incidence of acute kidney injury 640 
resulting from dehydration in vulnerable populations. The elderly, children under the age of 12 641 
months, and people with chronic cardiovascular and renal disease are particularly sensitive to these 642 
changes.10 643 
Here, a heatwave is defined as a period of more than 3 days where the minimum temperature is 644 
greater than the 99th percentile of the historical minima (1986-2008 average).18 This metric 645 
therefore focuses on periods of high night-time temperatures, which are critical in denying 646 
vulnerable people vital recuperation between hot days. Heatwave data were calculated against the 647 
historical period 1986-2008. The population for the exposure calculations was limited to people over 648 
the age of 65 (as this age group is most vulnerable to the health impacts of heatwaves), which was 649 
obtained on a per-country basis from the UN World Population Prospects archives for each year 650 
considered. 651 
Figure 1.2 shows the increase in total exposure to heatwaves over the 2000-2016 period (one 652 
heatwave experienced by one person). In 2015, the highest number of exposure events was 653 
recorded, with approximately 175 million additional people exposed to heatwaves. Figure 1.3 shows 654 
how the mean number of heatwave days experienced by people during any one heatwave 655 
(exposure-weighted) increases at a much faster rate than the global mean (area-weighted) number 656 
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of heatwave days per heatwave; this is due to high populations densities in areas where heatwaves 657 
have occurred. 658 
 659 
 660 
Figure 1.2 The change in exposure (in people aged over 65 years) to heatwaves from 2000 to 2016, relative to 661 
the heatwave exposure average from 1986-2008. 662 
 663 
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  664 
Figure 1.3 The area and exposure weighted change in mean heatwave lengths globally from 2000 to 2016 (in 665 
people aged over 65 years), relative to the 1986-2008 recent past average.  666 
 667 
Indicator 1.3: Change in labour capacity 668 
Headline Finding: Global labour capacity in populations exposed to temperature change is estimated 669 
to have decreased by 5.3% from 2000 to 2016. 670 
Higher temperatures pose significant threats to occupational health and labour productivity, 671 
particularly for those undertaking manual labour outside in hot areas. This indicator shows the 672 
change in labour capacity (and thus productivity) globally and specifically for rural regions, weighted 673 
by population (see Appendix 2 for details). Reductions in labour capacity have important 674 
implications for the livelihoods of individuals, families, and communities, with particular impacts on 675 
those relying on subsistence farming. 676 
Labour capacity was estimated in the manner documented by Watts et al. (2015), based on wet bulb 677 
globe temperatures.4 Figure 1.4 shows the estimated change in outdoor labour productivity 678 
represented as a percentage relative to the reference period (1986-2008), with 0% implying no 679 
change. Labour capacity is estimated to have decreased by 5.3% between 2000 and 2016, with a 680 
dramatic decrease of over 2% between 2015 and 2016. Although there are some peaks of increased 681 
labour capacity (notably 2000, 2004 and 2008), the overwhelming trend is one of reduced capacity 682 
(Figure 1.4). These effects are most notable in some of the most vulnerable countries in the world 683 
(Figure 1.5). 684 
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 685 
Figure 1.4 The exposure weighted labour capacity change (%) globally from 2000 to 2016, relative to the recent 686 
past (1986-2008) average 687 
 688 
 689 
Figure 1.5 Map of the change in labour capacity loss from 2000 to 2016, relative to the recent past (1986-2008) 690 
average. 691 
 692 
This indicator currently only captures the effects of heat on rural labour capacity. The Lancet 693 
Countdown will work to expand this metric in the future to capture impacts on labour capacity in 694 
other sectors, including manufacturing, construction, transportation, tourism and agriculture. 695 
Through collaboration with HEAT-SHIELD, the Lancet Countdown will work to develop this process 696 
going forward, providing more detailed analysis of labour capacity loss and the health implications of 697 
heat and heatwaves, globally.19,20 698 
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Indicator 1.4: Lethality of weather-related disasters 699 
Headline Finding: Despite a 46% increase in annual weather-related disasters from 2007 to 2016, 700 
compared with the 1990-1999 average, there has been no accompanying increase in the number of 701 
deaths, nor in those affected by disasters, nor in the ratio of these two outcomes. 702 
Weather-related events have been associated with over 90% of all disasters worldwide over the last 703 
twenty years. As expected, considering its population and area, the continent most affected by 704 
weather-related disasters is Asia, with some 2,843 events between 1990-2016 affecting 4.8 billion 705 
people and killing 505,013. Deaths from natural hazard-related disasters are largely concentrated in 706 
poorer countries.21 Crucially, this must be understood in the context of potentially overwhelming 707 
health impacts of future climate change, worsening significantly over the coming years. Indeed, the 708 
2015 Lancet Commission estimated an additional 1.4 billion drought exposure events, and 2.3 billion 709 
flood exposure events occurring by the end of the century – demonstrating clear public health limits 710 
to adaptation.4 711 
Disaster impact is a function of hazard and vulnerability, with vulnerability from a climate change 712 
perspective sometimes defined as a function of exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity.22 This 713 
indicator measures the ratio of the number of deaths, to the number of people affected by weather-714 
related disasters. Weather-related disasters included are: droughts, floods, extreme temperature 715 
events, storms and wildfires. The health impacts of weather-related disasters expand beyond 716 
mortality alone, including injuries, mental health impacts, spread of disease, and food and water 717 
insecurity. Data for the calculations for this indicator come from the Emergency Events Database 718 
(EM-DAT).23,24 Here, in line with the EM-DAT data used for analysis, a disaster is defined as either: 1) 719 
10 or more people reported killed, 2) 100 or more people affected, 3) a declaration of a state of 720 
emergency, or 4) a call for international assistance.  721 
Between 1994 and 2013, the frequency of reported weather-related events (mainly floods and 722 
storms) increased significantly. However, this trend may be partially accounted for by information 723 
systems having improved in the last 35 years, and statistical data are now more available as a result 724 
of increased socio-cultural sensitivity to disaster consequences and occurrence.25 From 2007 to 725 
2016, EM-DAT recorded an average of 306 weather-related disasters per annum, up 46% from the 726 
1990-1999 average.  However, owing to impressive poverty reduction and health adaptation efforts, 727 
this has not yet been accompanied by any discernible trend in number of deaths, nor in those 728 
affected by disasters, nor in the ratio of these two (Figure 1.6a). Indeed, separating out the disasters 729 
by the type of climate and weather hazard associated with the disaster (Figure 1.6b) shows there has 730 
been a statistically significant global decrease in the numbers affected by floods, equating to a 731 
decrease of 3 million people annually. Importantly, best available estimates and projections expect a 732 
sharp reversal in these trends over the coming decades, and it is notable that a number of countries 733 
have experienced increases in deaths associated with weather-related disasters, with many of these 734 
being high-income countries, illustrating that no country is immune to the impacts of climate change 735 
(see Appendix 2 for more details).A 736 
  25 
a)  737 
b)  738 
Figure 1.6 Deaths and people affected by weather-related disasters. 1.6a) Percentage change over time in the 739 
global number of deaths, the number of those affected, and the ratio of these (measured against 1990-2009). 740 
1.6b) Change over time in the number of people affected globally by different weather-related disasters. 741 
 742 
The relative stability of the number of deaths in a disaster as a proportion of those affected, despite 743 
an increase in the number of disasters, could be interpreted in a number of ways. One plausible 744 
conclusion is that this represents an increase in health service provision and risk reduction. However, 745 
although weather-related disasters have increased in number over the past three to four decades, 746 
the data here does not capture the severity of such events – a factor directly relevant to a country’s 747 
vulnerability and ability to adapt.22It is also important to note the difficulties in discerning overall 748 
trends, owing to the stochastic nature of the data and the relatively short time series. This poses 749 
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limitation on the significance of findings that can be drawn from analysis to date. Improving the 750 
validity of this indicator will be a focus going forward. 751 
Indicator 1.5: Global health trends in climate-sensitive diseases 752 
Headline Finding: Global health initiatives have overwhelmingly decreased deaths associated with 753 
climate-sensitive diseases since 1990, owing to important economic and public health advances over 754 
the last three decades.  755 
Disease occurrence is determined by a complex composite of social and environmental conditions 756 
and health service provision, all of which vary geographically. Nonetheless, some diseases are 757 
particularly sensitive to variations in climate and weather, and may thus be expected to vary with 758 
both longer-term climate change and shorter-term extreme weather events.10 This indicator draws 759 
from Global Burden of Disease (GBD) mortality estimates to show trends in deaths associated with 760 
seven climate-sensitive diseases since 1990 (Figure 1.7).27 761 
 762 
Figure 1.7 Trends in mortality from selected causes of death as estimated by the Global Burden of Disease 763 
2015, for the period 1990 to 2015, by WHO region.27 (Created using Global Burden of Disease, 2016 data). 764 
The disease trends above reveal global increases in dengue mortality, particularly in the Asia-Pacific 765 
and Latin America and Caribbean regions, with some peak years (including 1998) known to be 766 
associated with El Niño conditions.28 Beyond climate, likely drivers of dengue mortality include trade, 767 
urbanization, global and local mobility and climate variability; the association between increased 768 
dengue mortality and climate change is therefore complex.29 It naturally follows that an increase 769 
spread of the disease resulting from climate change will be a significant contributing factor in the 770 
increased likelihood of an associated increase in mortality. Malignant melanoma is a distinctive 771 
example of a non-communicable disease with a clear link to ultraviolet exposure, with mortality 772 
increasing steadily despite advances in surveillance and treatment; although it is important to 773 
recognise that increased exposures also occur as a result of changing lifestyles (for example, a rise in 774 
sun tanning). Heat and cold exposure is a potentially important aspect of climate-influenced 775 
mortality, although the underlying attribution of deaths to these causes in the estimates is 776 
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uncertain.30-35 Deaths directly related to forces of nature have been adjusted for the effects of the 777 
most severe seismic events. Of the ten highest country-year mortality estimates due to forces of 778 
nature, seven were directly due to specific seismic activity, and these have been discounted by 779 
replacing with the same countries’ force of nature mortality for the following year. The remaining 780 
major peaks relate to three extreme weather events (Bangladesh cyclone of 1991, Venezuela floods 781 
and mudslides of 1999 and Myanmar cyclone of 2008), which accounted for over 300,000 deaths. 782 
Overall, the findings here highlight the effectiveness and success of global health initiatives since 783 
1990, in largely reducing deaths associated with these diseases. Furthermore, these trends provide a 784 
proxy for the global health profile of climate-sensitive diseases and thus to some degree, indication 785 
of existing vulnerabilities and exposures to them. 786 
Indicator 1.6: Climate-sensitive infectious diseases 787 
Headline Finding: Vectorial capacity for the transmission of dengue by the mosquito vectors Aedes 788 
aeqypti and Aedes albopictus in regions where these vectors are currently present has increased 789 
globally due to climate trends by an average of 3% and 5.9%, respectively, compared to 1990 levels, 790 
and by 9.4% and 11.1%, respectively, compared to 1950s levels. 791 
Despite a declining overall trend, infectious diseases still account for around 20% of the global 792 
burden of disease and underpin more than 80% of international health hazards as classified by the 793 
World Health Organization (WHO).36,37 Climatic factors are routinely implicated in the epidemiology 794 
of infectious diseases, and they often interact with other factors, including behavioural, 795 
demographic, socio-economic, topographic and other environmental factors, to influence infectious 796 
disease emergence, distribution, incidence and burden.2,38 Understanding the contribution of 797 
climate change to infectious disease risk is thus complex, but necessary for advancing climate 798 
change mitigation and adaptation policies.14 This indicator is split into two components: a systematic 799 
literature review of the links between climate change and infectious diseases, and a vectorial 800 
capacity model for the transmission of dengue virus by the climate-sensitive vectors. 801 
For the first component, a systematic review of the climate change infectious disease literature was 802 
performed (see Appendix 2 for details), in which trends in the evolution of knowledge and direction 803 
of impact  of climate change disease risk associations were measured (Figure 1.8). The number of 804 
new publications fitting the search criteria in 2016 (n=89) was the highest yet reported, almost 805 
double the number published in 2015 (n=50) and more than triple the number published in 2014 806 
(n=25) (Figure 1.8, left). Over this period, the complexity of interactions between climate change and 807 
infectious disease has been increasingly recognised and understood (Figure 1.8, right). 808 
 809 
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 810 
 811 
Figure 1.8 Left: Academic publications reporting climate-sensitive infectious diseases by year. Right: proportion 812 
of responses reported in publications by year and direction of impact. 813 
 814 
Trends in the global potential for dengue virus transmission (as represented by vectorial capacity 815 
(VC) in the mosquito vectors Aedes aeqypti and Aedes albopictus) are presented. VC is “the rate 816 
(usually daily) at which a bloodsucking insect population generates new inoculations from a 817 
currently infectious case”.39 A global, mechanistic investigation was conducted of changes in annual 818 
transmission potential for a model, high burden, climate-sensitive vector-borne disease, dengue 819 
fever (Figure 1.9). For both vectors, VC in locations where these vectors are currently present 820 
reached its highest or equal highest average level in 2015 over the period considered (Figure 1.9, 821 
bottom panel). This consolidates a clear and significant increase in VC starting in the late 1970s 822 
(+3.0% and +6.0% compared to 1990 levels for A. aegypti and A. albopictus, respectively). Nearly all 823 
Aedes-positive countries showed relative increases in VC for both vectors over the period considered 824 
(Figure 1.9, top panel). Annual numbers of cases of dengue have doubled every decade since 1990, 825 
with 58.4 million (23.6 million–121.9 million) apparent cases in 2013, accounting for over 10,000 826 
deaths and 1.14 million (0.73 million–1.98 million) disability-adjusted life-years.40 Climate change has 827 
been suggested as one potential contributor to this increase in burden.41 Aedes aegypti and Aedes 828 
albopictus, the principal vectors of dengue, also carry other important emerging or re-emerging 829 
arboviruses, including Yellow Fever, Chikungunya, Mayaro and Zika viruses, which are likely similarly 830 
responsive to climate change.   831 
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Figure 1.9 Average annual vectorial capacity (VC) for dengue in Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus for 833 
selected Aedes-positive countries (countries with Aedes present) (top panel; matrix coloured relative to 834 
country mean 1950-2015; red = relatively higher VC, blue = relatively lower VC; countries ordered by centroid 835 
latitude (north to south)). Bottom panel:  average vectorial capacity (VC) for both vectors calculated globally 836 
(results shown relative to 1990 baseline). 837 
 838 
Indicator 1.7: Food security and undernutrition  839 
Isolating the impact of climate change on health through the indirect impacts on food security is 840 
complicated, as policies, institutions, and the actions of individuals, organisations, and countries, 841 
strongly influence the extent to which food systems are resilient to climate hazards or can adapt to 842 
climate change, and whether individual households are able to access and afford sufficient nutritious 843 
food. For example, with respect to undernourishment, vulnerability has been shown to be more 844 
dependent on adaptive capacity (such as infrastructure and markets) and sensitivity (such as forest 845 
cover and rain-fed agriculture) than exposure (such as temperature change, droughts, floods, 846 
storms).42 Given the role of human systems in mediating the links between climate, food, and health, 847 
the chosen indicators focus on abiotic and biotic indicators and current population vulnerabilities, 848 
considering both terrestrial and marine ecosystems. Undernutrition has been identified as the 849 
largest health impact of climate change in the 21st century.10,43-46  850 
  851 
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Indicator 1.7.1: Vulnerability to undernutrition 852 
Headline Finding: The number of undernourished people in the 30 countries located in Africa and 853 
Southern Asia with the highest prevalence (>15%) has increased from 398 million in 1990 to 422 854 
million in 2016. These are countries located in regions which are highly dependent on regional 855 
production for their food needs and where climate change is predicted to have the greatest negative 856 
impact on yields. 857 
The purpose of this indicator is to track the extent to which health will be compromised by climate 858 
change in countries where both current dependence on domestic production of food, and current 859 
level of undernourishment (which is strongly related to undernutrition) is already high. Climate 860 
change could further compromise health through changes in localised temperature and 861 
precipitation, manifested in falling yields. 862 
Food markets are increasingly globalised, and food security is increasingly driven by human systems. 863 
In response to falling yields caused by temperature increases, governments, communities, and 864 
organisations can and will undertake adaptation activities that might variously include breeding 865 
programmes, expansion of farmland, increased irrigation, or switching crops. However, the greater 866 
the loss of yield potential due to temperature increases, the more difficult adaptation becomes for 867 
populations dependent upon domestic food supply.  868 
Rising temperatures have been shown to reduce global wheat production, which has been estimated 869 
to fall 6% for each degree Celsius of additional temperature increase.47-49 Rice yields are sensitive to 870 
higher night temperatures, with each 1°C increase in growing-season minimum temperature in the 871 
dry season resulting in a fall in rice grain yield of 10%.50 Higher temperatures have been 872 
demonstrated rigorously to have a negative impact on crop yields in lower-latitude countries.51-53 873 
Moreover, agriculture in lower-latitudes tends to be more marginal, and more people are food 874 
insecure. 875 
This indicator, using data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 876 
focuses on vulnerability to undernutrition.54 Countries are selected for inclusion based on three 877 
criteria: the presence of moderate or high level of undernourishment, reflecting vulnerability; their 878 
physical location, focusing on geographies where a changing climate is predicted with high 879 
confidence to have a negative impact on the yields to staples produced; and dependence on regional 880 
production for at least half of its cereal consumption, reflecting high exposure to localised climate 881 
hazards. Based on these criteria, 30 countries, all located in Africa or Southern Asia, are included. 882 
Figure 1.10 presents the aggregated indicators, which shows the total number within the population 883 
undernourished in these 30 countries, multiplied by total dependence on regional production of 884 
grains. This gives a measure of how exposed already undernourished populations, who are highly 885 
dependent on regionally produced grains, are to localized climate hazards. 886 
 887 
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 888 
Figure 1.10 Total number of undernourished people multiplied by regional dependency on grain production for 889 
countries.  890 
The regions with the highest vulnerability to undernutrition also coincide with areas where yield 891 
losses due to warming are predicted to be relatively high, thus increasing the vulnerability of these 892 
populations to the negative health consequences of undernutrition. High dependence on one crop 893 
increases the vulnerability of individual countries further. For example, Kenya, which has a domestic 894 
production dependency for cereals of almost 80%, 69% dependent on maize, is experiencing high 895 
levels of undernutrition, and is particularly vulnerable to climate-related yield losses. Going forward, 896 
these data will be refined through country-level exploration, incorporation of the predicted impact 897 
of warming on yield losses, and incorporation of key temperature indicators such as ‘growing degree 898 
days’ above critical crop-specific thresholds.55,56 899 
 900 
Indicator 1.7.2: Marine primary productivity 901 
Declining fish consumption provides an indication of food insecurity, especially in local shoreline 902 
communities dependent upon marine sources for food, and hence are especially vulnerable to any 903 
declines in marine primary productivity affecting fish stocks.57 This is particularly concerning for the 904 
1 billion people around the world who rely on fish as their principal source of protein, placing them 905 
at increased risk of stunting (prevented from growing or developing properly) and malnutrition from 906 
food insecurity.58 In addition, fish are important for providing micronutrients, such as zinc, iron, 907 
vitamin A, vitamin B12, and Omega-3 fatty acids. If current fish declines continue, as many as 1.4 908 
billion people are estimated to become deficient and at elevated risk of certain diseases, particularly 909 
those associated with the cardiovascular system.59,60 910 
Marine primary productivity is determined by abiotic and biotic factors; measuring these globally 911 
and identifying relevant marine basins is complex. Factors such as sea surface temperature (SST), sea 912 
surface salinity (SSS), coral bleaching and phytoplankton numbers are key determinants of marine 913 
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primary productivity. Other local determinants have particularly strong influences on marine primary 914 
productivity. For example, harmful algal blooms (HAB) occur as a result of uncontrolled algal growth 915 
producing deadly toxins. The consumption of seafood contaminated with the toxins of harmful algal 916 
blooms, such as those produced by Alexandrium tamarense, is often very dangerous to human 917 
health, and potentially fatal.61  918 
Changes in SST and SSS from 1985 to present, for twelve fishery locations essential for aquatic food 919 
security are presented here. Data was obtained from NASA’s Earth Observatory Databank, and 920 
mapped across to the significant basins outlined in Appendix 2. From 1985 to 2016, a 1oC increase in 921 
SST (from an annual average of 22.74oC to 23.73oC) was recorded in these locations.62 This indicator 922 
requires significant further work to draw out the attribution to climate change and the health 923 
outcomes that may result. A case study on food security and fish stocks in the Persian Gulf is 924 
presented in Appendix 2. 925 
 926 
Indicator 1.8: Migration and population displacement 927 
Headline Finding: Climate change is the sole contributing factor for at least 4,400 people already 928 
being forced to migrate, globally. The total number for which climate change is a significant or 929 
deciding factor is significantly higher. 930 
Climate change-induced migration may occur through a variety of different social and political 931 
pathways, ranging from sea level rise and coastal erosion, through to changes in extremes and 932 
averages of precipitation and temperature decreasing the arability of land and exacerbating food 933 
and water security issues. Estimates of future “climate change migrants” up to 2050 vary widely, 934 
from 25 million to 1 billion.63 Such variation indicates the complexity of the multi-factorial nature of 935 
human migration, which depends on an interaction of local environmental, social, economic, and 936 
political factors. For example, in Syria, many attribute the initial and continued conflict to the rural-937 
to-urban migration that resulted from a climate change-induced drought.64,65 However, the factors 938 
leading to the violence are wide-ranging and complex, with clear quantifiable attribution particularly 939 
challenging. Indeed, climate change is often thought of as playing an important role in exacerbating 940 
the likelihood of conflict, and as a threat multiplier and an accelerant of instability.  Nonetheless, 941 
migration driven by climate change has potentially severe impacts on mental and physical health, 942 
both directly and through the disruption of essential health and social services.66 943 
Despite the methodological difficulties in proving a direct causal relationship between climate 944 
change and population displacement, there are areas where this is methodologically possible. This 945 
indicator focuses on these situations, attempting to isolate instances (as exemplars) where climate 946 
change is the sole contributory factor in migration decisions. Sea level rise provides the clearest 947 
example of this, although other examples exist as shown in Table 1.1. Estimating the number of 948 
people who have involuntarily migrated (both internally and internationally) as a result of climate 949 
change alone helps overcome the complexity of accounting for other societal, economic and 950 
environmental factors that also influence migration. 951 
Based on data derived from peer-reviewed academic publications (see Appendix 2 for full details). A 952 
minimum of 4,400 people have been forced to migrate due solely to climate change (Table 1.1). This 953 
will be an underestimate, as it excludes cases where more than one factor may be contributing to a 954 
migration decision – such as a combination of both climate-related sea level rise and coastal erosion 955 
not associated with climate change (possibly such as the village of Vunidogola, relocated by the 956 
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Fijian Government in 2014 for such reasons, and the planned relocation of the Fijian village of 957 
Narikoso by 2018).67-69 958 
 959 
Location Population Citation Notes on causes 
Carteret Islands, PNG 1,200 Connell (2016)70 
Strauss (2012)71 
Migrating due to sea-level rise 
Alaska (need to migrate 
as soon as possible)* 
 
 
 
Bronen and Chapin 
III (2013)72 
Shearer (2012)73 
Migrating due to changing ice 
conditions leading to coastal 
erosion and due to permafrost 
melt, destabilising infrastructure Kivalina 398-400 
Newtok 353 
Shaktoolik 214 
Shismaref 609 
Alaska (need to migrate 
gradually)* 
 
 
 
Bronen and Chapin 
III (2013)72 
 
Migrating due to changing ice 
conditions leading to coastal 
erosion and due to permafrost 
melt, destabilising infrastructure Allakaket 95 
Golovin 167 
Hughes 76 
Huslia 255 
Koyukuk 89 
Nulato 274 
Teller 256 
Unalakleet 724 
Isle de Jean Charles, 
Louisiana 
25 homes  Coastal erosion, wetland loss, 
reduced accretion, barrier island 
erosion, subsidence, and 
saltwater intrusion were caused 
by dredging, dikes, levees, 
controlling the Mississippi River, 
and agricultural practices. Climate 
change is now bringing sea-level 
rise 
Table 1.1 Locations migrating now due to only climate change. *The village names and populations are sourced 960 
from the US Government Accountability Office’s report, “Alaska Native Villages: Limited Progress Has Been 961 
Made on Relocating Villages Threatened by Flooding and Erosion”.70-73 962 
 963 
Over the long-term, human exposure and vulnerability to ice sheet collapse is increasing, as the 964 
number of people living close to the coast and at elevations close to sea level are also increasing. In 965 
1990, 450 million people lived within 20 km of the coast and less than 20 metres above sea level.74  966 
In 2000, 634 million (~10% of the global population), of whom 360 million are urban, lived below 10 967 
metres above sea level, (the highest vertical resolution investigated).75 With 2000 as a baseline, the 968 
population living below 10 metres above sea level will rise from 634 million to 1,005-1,091 million by 969 
2050 and 830-1,184 million by 2100.76 From 2100 and beyond, without mitigation and adaptation 970 
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interventions, over one billion people may need to migrate due to sea level rise caused by any ice 971 
sheet collapse which occurs.76,77 972 
Whilst this indicator is not yet able to capture the true number of people being forced to migrate 973 
due to climate change, that at least 4,400 people are already being forced to migrate as a result of 974 
climate change only is concerning and demonstrates that there are limits to adaptation. The fact 975 
that this is a significant underestimate further highlights the need to mitigate climate change and 976 
improve the adaptive capacity of populations to reduce future forced migration. Significantly, only 977 
instances of migration where climate change is isolated as the only factor are captured. Moving 978 
forward, new approaches will be required to more accurately reflect the number of people forced to 979 
migrate due to climate change, looking to capture situations where climate change plays an 980 
important contributory role alongside other social and economic considerations. 981 
 982 
Conclusion 983 
Climate change impacts health through diverse direct and indirect mechanisms. The indicators 984 
captured here provide an overview of a number of these effects, capturing exposure, impact, and 985 
underlying vulnerabilities. Going forward, indicators will be developed to better measure direct 986 
health outcome from climate change, in addition to exposure and vulnerabilities. 987 
The indicators presented here will be continuously developed over time in order to more directly 988 
capture mortality and morbidity outcomes from communicable and non-communicable diseases. 989 
Indeed, work is already underway to produce new indicators to capture these concepts for 990 
subsequent reports. Panel 1.1 and Appendix 2 describe one such ongoing process focused on mental 991 
health and climate change. 992 
Adaptation pathways can help to minimise some of the negative health impacts of global warming, 993 
especially for the lower range of projected average temperature rises. However, there are powerful 994 
limits to adaptation, and this section has drawn attention to the non-linearity and the spatial 995 
distribution of the health impacts of climate change. The indicators presented here demonstrate 996 
clearly that these impacts are being experienced across the world today, and provide a strong 997 
imperative for both adaptation and mitigation interventions to protect and promote public health. 998 
 999 
Panel 1.1 Mental Health and Climate Change 1000 
Measuring progress in the effects of climate change on mental health and wellbeing is difficult. 1001 
Whilst this is partly due to problems of attribution, the main measurement difficulty lies in the 1002 
inherently complicated nature of mental health, which embraces a diverse array of outcomes (for 1003 
instance, anxiety and mood disorders), many of which co-occur and all of which vary over contexts 1004 
and lifetimes. They are products of long and complex causal pathways, many of which can be traced 1005 
back to distal but potent root causes, such as famine, war and poverty, of which climate change is 1006 
both an example and an accelerator.78 1007 
Mental health, with its inherent intricacy, is a field where systems thinking is likely to be particularly 1008 
valuable. A first step, therefore, in tracking progress on mental health and climate change is to build 1009 
a conceptual framework using systems thinking. Initial work in partnership with the University of 1010 
Sydney has begun to trace through the many direct and indirect causal pathways, in order to aid the 1011 
identification of indicators. A number of challenges (e.g. how to gather and interpret highly 1012 
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subjective measures across cultures and income settings) are immediately apparent. Whilst further 1013 
work, and engagement with other partners will be required, potential indicators may focus on a 1014 
range of issues, including: national and local mental health emergency response capacity to climate-1015 
related extreme events; the extent to which climate change is considered within national mental 1016 
health strategies; or the social and psychological impact of uninsured economic losses that result 1017 
from extreme weather events.   1018 
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2. Adaptation Planning and Resilience for Health 1019 
 1020 
Introduction 1021 
 1022 
Climate change adaptation is defined by the IPCC as the “adjustment in natural or human systems in 1023 
response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits 1024 
beneficial opportunities”.80  With respect to health, adaptation consists of efforts to reduce injury, 1025 
illness, disability, and suffering from climate-related causes. Resilience has been defined as “the 1026 
capacity of individuals, communities and systems to survive, adapt, and grow in the face of stress 1027 
and shocks, and even transform when conditions require it”.81 In the context of climate change and 1028 
health, resilience is an attribute of individuals, communities, and health care systems; resilience at 1029 
all levels can reduce adverse health outcomes of climate change and should be a goal of adaptation 1030 
planning. 1031 
Indicators of resilience and adaptation are challenging to identify. Resilience is related to 1032 
preparedness, response, resource management and coordination capacity, but it is not synonymous 1033 
with them. Understanding the current resilience of a population’s health and health systems 1034 
provides some indication of resilience to climate change, although direct indicators measuring this 1035 
have not yet been developed by the Lancet Countdown. The indicators presented here are 1036 
predominantly process-based, focusing on health adaptation planning, capacity, and response. 1037 
Whilst the underlying resilience of communities is present to some extent in all of the indicators in 1038 
this section, it is currently only captured directly for health systems, and hence most indicators that 1039 
follow will focus more specifically on health adaptation. 1040 
 1041 
The indicators presented here are: 1042 
2.1 National adaptation plans for health 1043 
2.2 City-level climate change risk assessments 1044 
2.3 Detection and early warning of, preparedness for, and response to health emergencies 1045 
2.4 Climate information services for health 1046 
2.5 National assessment of vulnerability, impacts and adaptation for health 1047 
2.6 Climate-resilience health infrastructure 1048 
 1049 
Corresponding Appendix 3 provides more detailed discussion of the data and methods used. 1050 
 1051 
Indicator 2.1: National adaptation plans for health  1052 
Headline finding: 30 out of 40 responding countries have a national health adaptation plan or 1053 
strategy approved by the relevant national health authority. 1054 
Effective national responses to climate risks require that the health sector identify strategic goals in 1055 
response to anticipated – and unanticipated – threats. A critical step in achieving these strategic 1056 
goals is the development of a national health adaptation plan, outlining priority actions, resource 1057 
requirements and a specific timeline and process for implementation. This indicator tracks the policy 1058 
commitments of national governments for health and climate change adaptation. Data are drawn 1059 
from the recent WHO Climate and Health Country Survey (Panel 2.1). 1060 
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Of the 40 countries responding to this baseline survey, 30 reported having a national adaptation 1061 
strategy for health, approved by their Ministry of Health or relevant health authority (Figure 2.1). 1062 
This number includes countries with a health component of their National Adaptation Plan (NAPs), 1063 
which was established by the UNFCCC to help nations identity medium- and long-term adaptation 1064 
needs and develop and implement programmes to address those needs.82 There is a need for 1065 
caution in extrapolating the results to global level, as many of the respondent countries have 1066 
received support from WHO in developing and implementing their plans.83,84 Nonetheless, with 75% 1067 
of respondents in the survey having an approved national health adaptation plan there is evidence 1068 
of the recognition of the need to adapt to climate change. Countries with national health adaptation 1069 
plans are found across all regions and, perhaps most significantly, among some of the most 1070 
vulnerable countries across Africa, South East Asia and South America. In future iterations of the 1071 
survey, data will be gathered on the content and quality of these adaptation plans, their level of 1072 
implementation, the main priorities for health adaptation, internal monitoring and review processes, 1073 
and the level of funding available to support policy interventions. 1074 
 1075 
 1076 
  1077 
 1078 
Figure 2.1 Countries with national heath climate adaptation strategies or plans. 1079 
 1080 
Panel 2.1: WHO-UNFCCC Climate and Health Country Profiles. 1081 
The WHO-UNFCCC Climate and Health Country Profile Project forms the foundation of WHO’s 1082 
national level provision of information, and monitoring of progress, in this field. The profiles, 1083 
developed in collaboration with ministries of health and other health determining sectors, support 1084 
evidence-based decision making to strengthen the climate resilience of health systems and promote 1085 
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actions that improve health while reducing carbon emissions. In part, the data used in the 1086 
development of the climate and health country profiles is collected through a biennial WHO Climate 1087 
and Health Country Survey. Data from this survey is reported on for indicators 2.1, 2.5 and 2.6 1088 
The 2015 baseline survey findings for 40 responding nations are presented in this report (for a 1089 
complete list of country respondents, see Appendix 3). The findings include countries from all WHO 1090 
regions (high, middle and low income groups) and with varying levels of risks and vulnerabilities to 1091 
the health impacts of climate change. The 2015 survey data were validated as part of the national 1092 
consultation process seeking input on respective WHO UNFCCC Climate and Health Country Profiles 1093 
from key in-country stakeholders, including representatives of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of 1094 
Environment, meteorological services and WHO country and regional technical officers. 1095 
The validated data presented in this report tended to include a high number of countries that are 1096 
actively working on climate and health with WHO; as such, the results here are indicative and are 1097 
not meant to be inferred as an exact indicator of global status. The number of country respondents 1098 
is expected to double in subsequent iterations of the survey. As such, the results presented here 1099 
represent the beginning of the development of a more comprehensive survey, presenting results 1100 
available at the start of this process. 1101 
 1102 
Indicator 2.2: City-level climate change risk assessments 1103 
Headline Finding: Of the 449 self-reporting cities, 45% have climate change risk assessments in 1104 
place. 1105 
Globally, 54.5% of people live in cities, where key health infrastructure is often concentrated.85 1106 
These urban centres are increasingly at risk from climate change, with negative impacts predicted 1107 
for human health and health services. These risks require city-level responses to complement NAPs, 1108 
in order to improve cities’ ability to adapt to climate change. Indeed, cities have a unique 1109 
opportunity to provide adaptation measures that help improve the resilience of urban populations, 1110 
whilst also helping mitigate the impacts of climate change on public health.86 1111 
Data for this indicator comes from the 2016 global survey of the Compact of Mayors and the Carbon 1112 
Disclosure Project (CDP).87 88 Of the 449 cities with public responses (533 cities responded overall), 1113 
45% reported to “have undertaken a climate change risk or vulnerability assessment for [their] local 1114 
government” (Figure 2.2).89 1115 
The highest number of cities with climate change risk assessments are in high income countries 1116 
(HICs) (118 cities), with only 42 cities in low-income countries. This partly reflects the fact that more 1117 
cities in HICs were surveyed, and partly the fact that these cities have a greater capacity to develop 1118 
such plans. There were a higher number of respondents from cities in HICs compared with low 1119 
income (236 versus 61). 1120 
European cities in this survey have the highest number of climate change risk assessments (56 1121 
cities), representing 83% of European cities surveyed. Conversely, only 28% of surveyed African cities 1122 
have climate change risk assessments. This has serious implications for the adaptive capacity of 1123 
some of the most vulnerable populations to climate change in low income countries. A concerted 1124 
effort must be made to increase the number of climate change risk assessment in cities in low-1125 
income countries, in order to better understand their vulnerability to climate change impacts and 1126 
implement adaptation actions. 1127 
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 1128 
Figure 2.2 Number of global cities undertaking climate change risk assessments by a) income grouping, and b) 1129 
WHO region. 1130 
 1131 
Indicator 2.3: Detection and early warning of, preparedness for, and response to climate 1132 
related health emergencies 1133 
Headline Finding:  Due to focused investment in the implementation of the International Health 1134 
Regulations (2005), national capacities relevant to climate adaptation and resilience, including 1135 
disease surveillance and early detection, multi-hazard public health emergency preparedness and 1136 
response, and the associated human resources to perform these public health functions, have 1137 
increased markedly from 2010 to 2016 in all world regions.  1138 
Many initiatives at community, national, regional and global levels support strengthening country 1139 
capacities for health emergency and disaster risk management and complement the implementation 1140 
of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, Sustainable Development Goal 3D, the Paris 1141 
Agreement on Climate Change and the International Health Regulations (2005). Under the 1142 
International Health Regulations (IHR (2005)), all States Parties should report to the World Health 1143 
Assembly annually on the implementation of IHR (2005).91,92 In order to facilitate this process, WHO 1144 
developed an IHR Monitoring questionnaire, interpreting the Core Capacity Requirements in Annex 1 1145 
  40 
of IHR (2005) into 20 indicators for 13 capacities (Panel 2.2). These metrics can serve as important 1146 
proxies of health system adaptive capacity and system resilience, since they measure the extent to 1147 
which health systems demonstrate a range of attributes necessary to detect, prepare for and 1148 
respond to public health emergencies, some of which are climate sensitive. Four capacities reflecting 1149 
seven indicators from IHR Monitoring questionnaire are reported here: surveillance, preparedness, 1150 
response, and human resources. Additional details of all four of these IHR Capacities can be found in 1151 
Appendix 3.  1152 
Panel 2.2: The International Health Regulations (2005). 1153 
The current IHR (2005), which entered into force in 2007, is legally binding on 196 States Parties, 1154 
including all WHO member states. It requires States Parties to detect, assess, notify and report, and 1155 
respond promptly and effectively to public health risks and public health emergencies of 1156 
international concern (IHR Article 5, 13) and to develop, strengthen and maintain the capacity to 1157 
perform these functions (IHR Article 5). Examples of required core capacities include national 1158 
legislation, policy and financing; public health surveillance; preparedness and response; risk 1159 
communication; human resources; and laboratory services. Under the International Health 1160 
Regulations (IHR (2005)), all States Parties should report to the World Health Assembly annually on 1161 
the implementation of IHR (2005). In order to facilitate this process, WHO developed an IHR 1162 
Monitoring questionnaire.93 The method of estimation calculates the proportion/percentage of 1163 
attributes (a set of specific elements or functions that reflect the performance or development of a 1164 
specific indicator) reported to be in place in a country. Since 2010, 195 States Parties have submitted 1165 
self-reports at least once. Indicator 2.3 is drawn from the results of these questionnaires to which 1166 
129 of 196 States Parties responded in 2016.94 1167 
 1168 
The first of these capacities is human resources, which reflects a single indicator: ‘human resources 1169 
available to implement the International Health Regulations Core Capacities’. This is a useful proxy in 1170 
lieu of an indicator that looks at specific capacity for health adaptation to climate change (Figure 1171 
2.3a). In 2010, capacity scores ranged from 25% in Africa to 57% in Western Pacific. Human resource 1172 
capacity has improved markedly by 2016, where on the average the capacity score is 67% (with the 1173 
lowest score in the Africa region reporting 51% and the highest in the Western Pacific Region 89%).  1174 
Secondly, surveillance capacity, summarizes two indicators in the IHR questionnaire ‘Indicator-based 1175 
surveillance includes an early warning function for early detection of a public health event’, and 1176 
‘Event-Based Surveillance is established and functioning’. This capacity score is used as a proxy for a 1177 
health system’s ability to anticipate and identify outbreaks and changing patterns of climate-1178 
sensitive infectious diseases, such as zoonosis and food-related outbreaks. Globally, 129 reporting 1179 
States Parties scored 88% for this capacity in 2016 (Figure 2.3b). This proportion has increased 1180 
steadily since 2010 (average score of 63%), indicating that health systems have increasing capacity 1181 
for early detection of public health events. 1182 
Thirdly, preparedness capacity reflects ‘Multi-hazard National Public Health Emergency 1183 
Preparedness and Response Plan is developed and implemented’, comprised of the presence of a 1184 
plan, the implementation of the plan, and the ability for this plan to operate under unexpected 1185 
stress, and ‘priority public health risks and resources are mapped and utilized’. Of responding 1186 
countries, progress can be seen in all world regions from 49% in 2010 to a 2016 global average of 1187 
76% (Figure 4.3c). 1188 
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Finally, response capacity, reflects the availability and functioning of public health emergency 1189 
response mechanisms, and Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) at national and hospital levels. 1190 
This capacity is an important proxy for the ability of the health system to mobilize effective 1191 
responses when shocks or stresses are detected. All countries demonstrate between 73-91% 1192 
response capacity in 2016, with notable progress seen in Africa between 2010 (47%) and 2016 (73%) 1193 
(Figure 2.3d). 1194 
a)  1195 
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b)  1196 
c)  1197 
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d)  1198 
Figure 2.3: IHR capacity scores by WHO region. 2.3a) Human Resources capacity score. 2.3b) Surveillance 1199 
capacity score. 2.3c) Preparedness capacity score. 2.3d) Response capacity score. 1200 
There are some limitations to considering these capacities. Most importantly, IHR survey responses 1201 
are self-reported; although national-level external verification has begun it currently remains 1202 
relatively limited. Additionally, these findings capture potential capacity – not action. Finally, the 1203 
quality of surveillance for early detection and warning is not shown, nor is the impact of that 1204 
surveillance on public health. Response systems have been inadequate in numerous public health 1205 
emergencies and thus the presence of such plans is not a proxy for their effectiveness. 1206 
 1207 
Indicator 2.4: Climate information services for health 1208 
Headline Finding: Out of the 100 WHO Member States responding to the WMO Survey, 73% report 1209 
providing climate information to the health sector in their country. 1210 
This indicator measures the proportion of countries whose Meteorological and Hydrological services 1211 
self-reported to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), providing tailored climate 1212 
information, products and services to their national public health sector.95 Response rates for the 1213 
2015 WMO survey were:  71% in the African region, 67% in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, 79% 1214 
in the European Region, 81% in the Region of the Americas, 67% in the South-East Asia Region and 1215 
44% in the Western Pacific Region.  1216 
Taking into account the total number of WHO members (respondent and non-respondent) per WHO 1217 
region, only between 14.8 % and 51.4% are known to provide climate information to the health 1218 
sector (Figure 2.4) and between 18% and 55% did not provide information.  1219 
 1220 
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 1221 
Figure 2.4: National Meteorological and Hydrological Services (NHMSs) of WHO member states reporting to 1222 
provide targeted/tailored climate information, products and services to the health sector. 1223 
However, it is important to note that this sample is not representative of all countries (49% non-1224 
response rate) and these are self-reported results. Crucially, this indicator does not capture the type 1225 
of climate products made available, quality of the data provided, the ways in which the health sector 1226 
makes use of this data (if at all), and whether the data is presented in a format and timely fashion 1227 
relevant to public health. Future WMO surveys will aim to provide greater insight to the specific 1228 
applications of climate information. See Appendix 3 for more information. 1229 
 1230 
Indicator 2.5: National assessments of climate change impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation 1231 
for health 1232 
Headline Finding: Over two thirds of responding countries report having conducted a national 1233 
assessment of climate change impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation for health.  1234 
National assessments of climate change impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation for health allow 1235 
governments to understand more accurately the extent and magnitude of potential threats to health 1236 
from climate change, the effectiveness of current adaptation and mitigation policies and future 1237 
policy and programme requirements. Although national assessments may vary in scope between 1238 
countries, the number of countries that have conducted a national assessment of climate change 1239 
impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation for health is a key indicator to monitor the global availability 1240 
of information required for adequate management of health services, infrastructure and capacities 1241 
to address climate change. This indicator tracks the number of countries that have conducted 1242 
national assessments, based on responses to the 2015 WHO Climate and Health Country Survey 1243 
(Panel 2.1). 1244 
Over two-thirds of countries sampled (27 out of 40) reported having conducted a national 1245 
assessment of impacts vulnerability, and adaptation for health (Figure 2.5). These countries cover all 1246 
regions and include countries that are particularly vulnerable; for instance, of the nine responding 1247 
countries in the South-East Asia Region, eight countries (Bangladesh, Bhutan, Indonesia, Maldives, 1248 
Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Timor-Leste) reported having national assessments of impacts, 1249 
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vulnerability, and adaptation for health. Increasing global coverage of countries with national 1250 
vulnerability and adaptation assessments for health is the result of WHO’s support to countries 1251 
through projects and technical guidance.96 1252 
 1253 
Figure 2.5 Countries with national assessment of climate change impacts, vulnerability and adaptation for 1254 
health. 1255 
 1256 
Indicator 2.6: Climate-resilient health infrastructure 1257 
Headline Finding: Only 40% (16 out of 40) of responding countries reported implementing activities 1258 
to increase the climate resilience of their health infrastructure. 1259 
Functioning health infrastructure is essential during emergencies. Climate-related events, such as 1260 
severe storms and flooding, may compromise electrical and water supplies, interrupt supply chains, 1261 
disable transportation links, and disrupt communications and IT networks, contributing to reduced 1262 
capacity to provide medical care. This indicator measures efforts by countries to increase the climate 1263 
resilience of health infrastructure. The climate resiliency of health infrastructure reflects the extent 1264 
to which these systems can prepare for and adapt to changes in climate impacting the system. Data 1265 
is drawn from the WHO Climate and Health Country Survey (Panel 2.1). Only 40% of countries (16 1266 
out of 40) reported having taken measures to increase the climate resilience of their health 1267 
infrastructure (Figure 2.6). These results suggest widespread vulnerability of health system 1268 
infrastructure to climate change. For example, only two out of nine responding countries in the 1269 
African Region report efforts to improve the climate resiliency of health infrastructure. Similar trends 1270 
were found across other WHO regions. 1271 
 1272 
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 1273 
Figure 2.6 Countries taking measures to increase the climate resilience of health infrastructure. 1274 
 1275 
This indicator does not capture the quality or effectiveness of efforts to build climate-resilient health 1276 
system infrastructure. Nonetheless, it highlights the importance of ensuring that countries work to 1277 
implement climate-resilient health infrastructure, as these findings suggest this is generally lacking. 1278 
 1279 
Conclusion 1280 
This section has presented indicators across a range of areas relevant to health adaptation and 1281 
resilience. It is clear that the public, and the health systems they depend upon, are ill-prepared to 1282 
manage the health impacts of climate change.  1283 
In many cases, the data and methods available provide only a starting-point for an eventual suite of 1284 
indicators that capture health-specific adaptation, and include both process-and outcome-based 1285 
indicators. New indicators will also be required to better capture important indicators of resilience. 1286 
 1287 
 1288 
 1289 
3. Mitigation Actions and Health Co-Benefits 1290 
 1291 
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Introduction 1292 
Sections one and two have covered the health impacts of climate change, the adaptation available 1293 
and currently being implemented, and the limits to this adaptation.10 This third section presents a 1294 
series of indicators relevant to the near-term health co-benefits of climate mitigation policies. 1295 
Accounting for this enables a more complete consideration of the total cost and benefits of such 1296 
policies, and is essential in maximising the cumulative health benefits of climate change mitigation. 1297 
The health co-benefits of meeting commitments under the Paris Agreement are potentially 1298 
immense, reducing the burden of disease for many of the greatest global health challenges faced 1299 
today and in the future.97 The indicators presented in this section describe a clear and urgent need 1300 
to increase the scope of mitigation ambition if the world is to keep global average temperatures 1301 
“well below 2°C”.7 1302 
Countries are accelerating their response to climate change, with Finland, the UK, China, France, 1303 
Canada and the Netherlands making strong commitments to phase-out or dramatically reduce their 1304 
dependence on coal.98-101 By 2017, electric vehicles are poised to be cost-competitive with their 1305 
petroleum equivalents, a phenomenon that was not expected until 2030. Globally, more renewable 1306 
energy capacity is being built every year than all other sources combined.101,102 Consequently, 1307 
renewable energy is now broadly cost-competitive with fossil fuels, with electricity from low-latitude 1308 
solar PV being cheaper than natural gas.101-103 1309 
 1310 
Tracking the health co-benefits of climate change mitigation 1311 
Meeting the Paris Agreement will require global GHG emissions to peak within the next few years 1312 
and undergo rapid reduction thereafter, implying near-term actions and medium- and long-term 1313 
cuts through country-level activities.8 Global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industry were 36.3 1314 
GtCO2 in 2015 (60% higher than in 1990), while emissions from land use change – which is 1315 
intrinsically difficult to estimate – was approximately 4.8 GtCO2. In the same year, 41% of the total 1316 
fossil fuel and industry emissions were estimated to come from coal, 34% from oil, 19% from gas, 1317 
and 6% from cement.104 In 2015, the largest emitters of CO2 were China (29%), the USA (15%), the 1318 
European Union’s (EU) 28 member states ((EU28); 10%) and India (6.3%). However, per capita 1319 
emissions of CO2 belie the disparity driven by consumption, with global mean emissions at 4.8 tCO2 1320 
per person per year compared to 16.8 in the USA, 7.7 in China, 7.0 in EU28, and 1.8 in India.104 1321 
The actions needed to embark on rapid decarbonisation include avoiding the ‘lock-in’ of carbon 1322 
intensive infrastructure and energy systems, reducing the cost of ‘scaling-up’ low-carbon systems, 1323 
minimising reliance on unproven technologies, and realising opportunities of near-term co-benefits 1324 
for health, security, and the environment.8 These actions will need to also be cost-effective and 1325 
supported by non-state actors and industry. 1326 
Indicators in this section are broadly considered within the framework of Driving Force-Pressure-1327 
State-Exposure-Effect-Action (DPSEEA). The DPSEEA framework is recognized as being suitable for 1328 
the development of environmental health indicators, and identification of entry points for policy 1329 
intervention.105 An adaptation of the framework for examination of the health co-benefits of climate 1330 
change mitigation is explained in Appendix 4. 1331 
Here, health co-benefit indicators are captured for four sectors: 1) energy, 2) transport, 3) food, and 1332 
4) healthcare. Appendix 4 provides more detailed discussion of the data and methods used. 1333 
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Energy Supply and Demand Sectors 1334 
Fossil fuel burning comprises the largest single source of GHG emissions globally, producing an 1335 
estimated 72% of all GHG emissions resulting from human activities.106,107 The majority (66%) of 1336 
these emissions arise in the energy sector from the production of thermal and electric power for 1337 
consumption across a range of sectors including industry, commercial, residential and transport. 1338 
To meet the climate change mitigation ambitions of the Paris Agreement, it is widely accepted that 1339 
the energy system will need to largely complete the transition towards near zero-carbon emissions 1340 
by, or soon after, 2050, and then to negative emissions in the latter part of the century.108,109 Recent 1341 
analysis has framed the necessary action as a halving of CO2 emissions every decade.110 1342 
The potential short-term health benefits of such strategies are substantial, with significant 1343 
improvements from a reduction in indoor and outdoor air pollution; more equitable access to 1344 
reliable energy for health facilities and communities; and lower costs of basic energy services for 1345 
heating, cooking, and lighting to support higher quality of life. 1346 
 1347 
Indicator 3.1: Carbon intensity of the energy system 1348 
Headline Finding: Globally, the carbon intensity of total primary energy supply (TPES) has remained 1349 
stable since 1990, between 55-56 tCO2/TJ, reflecting the significant global challenge of energy 1350 
system decarbonisation. This has occurred because countries, which have achieved a reduction in 1351 
carbon intensity (USA, UK, Germany), have been offset by those which have increased the carbon 1352 
intensity of their energy supply (India and China). 1353 
To achieve the 2°C target (at a 66% probability), the global energy sector must reduce CO2 emissions 1354 
to more than 70% below current levels by 2050. This means a large reduction in the carbon intensity 1355 
of the global energy system, which can be measured as the tonnes of CO2 for each unit of total 1356 
primary energy supplied (tCO2/TJ). TPES reflects the total amount of primary energy used in a 1357 
specific country, accounting for the flow of energy imports and exports.111 Commitments under the 1358 
Paris Agreement should begin to lower the overall carbon intensity of TPES, with the aim of reducing 1359 
to near-zero by 2050. 1360 
Drawing on data from the International Energy Agency (IEA), this indicator shows that globally, since 1361 
the 1990s, the carbon intensity of primary energy supply has remained between 55-56 tCO2/TJ.112 1362 
However, a 53% growth in energy demand over the period has meant that global CO2 emissions have 1363 
grown significantly. Rapidly, low and middle income countries (LMICs) have seen an increase in 1364 
carbon intensity since the 1970s, driven by increased coal use (Figure 3.1). For example, India’s TPES 1365 
has almost tripled since 1980, with the share of coal in the mix doubling (from 22% to 44%). Over the 1366 
same period, 1980-2014, a fourfold increase in China’s TPES, combined with increasing carbon 1367 
intensity due to the coal share of TPES increasing from 52% to 66%, has led to strong growth in 1368 
emissions. 1369 
High-income countries have seen carbon intensity fall since the 1970s (for example, the USA and 1370 
Germany in Figure Figure Figure 3.1). This decrease has resulted from a move away from coal use in 1371 
energy production and use, reduced heavy industrial output, and increased use of lower carbon 1372 
fuels, notably moving from coal to natural gas in the power sector and the use of renewable energy. 1373 
 1374 
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 1375 
Figure 3.1 Carbon intensity of Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES) for selected countries, and total CO2 1376 
emissions (shaded area against secondary y-axis),1971-2013. 1377 
 1378 
Indicator 3.2: Coal phase-out 1379 
Headline Finding: Globally, total primary coal supply has increased from 92 EJ in 1990, to 160 EJ in 1380 
2015. However, the 2015 supply level represents a reduction from the high point of 164 EJ in 2013, 1381 
providing an encouraging indication that global coal consumption has peaked and is now in decline. 1382 
 1383 
The primary means of reducing carbon intensity of the energy system within necessary timescales 1384 
will be the phase-out of coal.  Worldwide, coal supplies 30% of energy use and is the source of 44% 1385 
of global CO2 emissions. The dirtiest form of coal produces almost twice the carbon per unit of 1386 
primary energy than the least carbon intensive fossil fuel – natural gas.112 Given that a large share of 1387 
coal is used for power generation, it is an important sector of focus, both to reduce CO2 emissions 1388 
and mitigate a major source of air pollution.112 1389 
This indicator of coal phase-out is the total primary coal supply (EJ) in the energy system (Figure 3.2), 1390 
which makes use of recent data from the IEA.112  1391 
Globally, coal use has increased by just under 60% since 1990. This is due to strong growth in global 1392 
energy demand, and an increasing share of TPES coming from coal, rising from 26% to 29% between 1393 
1990 and 2014.112 This growth has largely been driven by China’s increasing use of coal in industry 1394 
and for electricity production, particularly in the 2000s (see East Asia trend in Figure Figure Figure 1395 
3.2). Crucially, growth in coal use has plateaued and reduced since 2013, in large part due to a 1396 
recognition of the health effects of air pollution, slower growth and structural changes in China’s 1397 
economy, and a slowing in energy sector expansion.113 India has also seen significant growth in coal 1398 
use, with the share of coal in TPES increasing from 31% in 1990 to 46% in 2015. The other large coal 1399 
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consuming regions are the USA and Europe. The USA has had a stable level of consumption since the 1400 
1990s, but experienced a recent fall in use, particularly in energy production and use, due to the 1401 
cost-competitiveness of shale gas. Europe has seen a steady decline in coal use since the 1990s, 1402 
again through a move to gas in economies such as the UK, although this overall downward trend has 1403 
transitioned to a plateau in recent years.  1404 
Today, China and India both have similar shares of electricity generate by coal, at around 75% of 1405 
total generation. Whilst this trend is plateauing in China, this is not observed in other parts of Asia, 1406 
and the rapidly-emerging economies of Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines see strong 1407 
growth from coal.112 1408 
Meeting the IEA’s 2°C pathway and the Paris Agreement requires that no new coal-fired plants be 1409 
built (beyond those with construction currently underway), with a complete phase-out of unabated 1410 
plants (not fitted with carbon capture and storage) occurring by 2040. Crucially, such a transition 1411 
may have started, with the amount of coal power capacity in pre-construction planning at 570 1412 
gigawatts (GW) in January 2017, compared to 1,090 GW in January 2016.114 There are a range of 1413 
reasons for this large reduction, including decreasing planned capacity expansion, a desire to tackle 1414 
air pollution, and active efforts to expand renewable investment.  1415 
 1416 
 1417 
 1418 
Figure 3.2 Total primary coal supply by country or region, and globally (shaded area against secondary y-axis), 1419 
1990-2015. 1420 
 1421 
 1422 
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Indicator 3.3: Zero-carbon emission electricity 1423 
Headline Finding: Globally, renewable electricity as a share of total generation has increased by over 1424 
20% from 1990 to 2013. In 2015, renewable energy capacity added exceeded that of new fossil fuel 1425 
capacity, with 80% of recently added global renewable energy capacity currently located in China. 1426 
Where renewables displace fossil fuels, in particular coal, it represents the beginning of reductions in 1427 
morbidity and mortality from air pollution, and a potentially remarkable success for global health. 1428 
As coal is phased out of the energy system, in particular in electricity production, the rapid scaling up 1429 
of zero-carbon energy production and use will be crucial. To remain on a 2°C pathway, renewables-1430 
based capacity additions will need to be sustained over the next 35 years, reaching 400 GW per year 1431 
by 2050, which is two and a half times the current level. Critical renewable technologies for 1432 
achieving this will be solar, wind and hydroelectric.  1433 
Indicator 3.3 draws on IEA data, and considers both renewable and other zero-carbon electricity.112 1434 
Conversely, renewable energy refers to “all forms of energy produced from renewable sources in a 1435 
sustainable manner, which include: bioenergy, geothermal, hydropower, ocean energy (tidal, wave, 1436 
thermal), solar energy and wind energy”.115 By comparison, zero-carbon energy means no GHG 1437 
emissions (i.e. zero-carbon and carbon equivalent) at the point of energy production and use, which 1438 
therefore also includes nuclear-powered electricity, but excludes biomass. 1439 
Both displace the use of fossil fuels (although notably fossil capacity tends to have annual higher 1440 
load factors than renewables), reducing air pollution and GHG emissions, and so are important 1441 
indicators for climate change and for health. One caveat is that the combustion of solid biomass 1442 
fuels such as wood, sometimes promoted for climate change mitigation purposes, may increase fine 1443 
particulate air pollution exposure and may not be carbon-neutral.116 1444 
As a share of total generation, renewable energy has increased by over 20% from 1990 to 2013.  1445 
Renewable energy continues to grow rapidly, mainly from increasing wind and solar PV investment, 1446 
most notably in the USA, China and Europe (Figure 3.3). In 2015, more renewable energy capacity 1447 
(150GW) was added than fossil fuel plant capacity added globally. Overall, there is now more added 1448 
renewable generation capacity installed globally (almost 2000 GW) than coal, with about 80% of this 1449 
newly installed capacity located in China.112  1450 
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 1451 
a) b)  1452 
c) d)  1453 
Figure 3.3 Renewable and zero-carbon emission electricity generation a) Share of electricity generated from 1454 
zero carbon sources; b) Electricity generated from zero carbon sources, TWh; c) Share of electricity generated 1455 
from renewable sources (excluding hydro); d) Electricity generated from renewable sources (excl. hydro), TWh. 1456 
 1457 
Indicator 3.4: Access to clean energy 1458 
Headline Finding: In 2016, it was reported that 1.2 billion people did not have access to electricity, 1459 
with 2.7 billion people relying on the burning of unsafe, unsustainable, and inefficient solid fuels. 1460 
Increased access to clean fuels and clean energy technologies will have the dual benefit of reducing 1461 
indoor air pollution exposure, and reducing GHG emissions by displacing fossil fuels.117 The use of 1462 
clean energy for heating, cooling, cooking and lighting plays an important role in improving global 1463 
health and wellbeing, economic productivity, and reducing the risk of harm from living in energy 1464 
poverty.118  1465 
It is estimated that globally, 1.2 billion people do not currently have access to electricity and 2.7 1466 
billion people rely on burning unsustainable and inefficient solid fuels, which contributes to poor 1467 
indoor air quality (see Panel 3.1), estimated to result in 4.3 million premature deaths related to 1468 
pneumonia, stroke, lung cancer, heart disease, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) 1469 
each year.119,120 Access to electricity, an energy source that emits no direct airborne particles 1470 
(though particles may be emitted indirectly through the fuel used to generate the electrical power), 1471 
is currently 85.3% globally but varies widely among countries and urban and rural settings. 1472 
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This indicator draws on and aligns with the proposed Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicator 1473 
7.1.2, defining ‘clean energy’ in terms of emission rate targets and specific fuel recommendations 1474 
(i.e. against unprocessed coal and kerosene) included in the WHO normative guidance.121 It 1475 
estimates the proportion of the population who primarily rely on clean fuels (including liquefied 1476 
petroleum gas, which, while still a fossil fuel, is cleaner than many solid fuels) and technologies for 1477 
cooking, heating and lighting compared to all people accessing those services. The data used for this 1478 
indicator comes from estimates of fuel use from WHO household survey data from roughly 800 1479 
nationally representative surveys and censuses, and is modelled to estimate the proportion of their 1480 
reliance on clean fuels (Figure 3.4).122  1481 
 1482 
Figure 3.4 Proportion of population relying primarily on clean fuels and technology. 1483 
 1484 
Indicator 3.5: Exposure to ambient air pollution  1485 
Headline Finding: 71% of the 2,971 cities in the WHO’s database do not satisfy WHO annual fine 1486 
particulate matter exposure recommendations.  1487 
Air pollutants directly harmful to health are emitted by combustion processes that also contribute to 1488 
emissions of GHGs. As such, properly designed actions to reduce GHG emissions will lead to 1489 
improvements in ambient air quality, with associated benefits for human wellbeing.123 Current 1490 
estimates suggest that global population-weighted fine particulate matter (PM2.5) exposure has 1491 
increased by 11.2% since 1990.123,124 To represent levels of exposure to air pollution, this indicator 1492 
collects information on annual average urban background concentrations of PM2.5 in urban settings 1493 
across the world. 1494 
 1495 
3.5.1: Exposure to air pollution in cities 1496 
The data for this indicator makes use of the WHO’s Urban Ambient Air Pollution Database, which 1497 
compiles information from a range of public sources, including national and subnational reports and 1498 
websites, regional networks, intergovernmental agencies, and academic publications.125 The air 1499 
pollution measurements are taken from monitoring stations located in urban background, 1500 
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residential, commercial, and mixed areas. The annual average density of emission sources in urban 1501 
areas and the proximity of populations to those sources led the Lancet Countdown to focus on 1502 
exposure in cities. 1503 
For this indicator, the Lancet Countdown has combined the WHO database with the Sustainable 1504 
Healthy Urban Environments (SHUE) database, presenting data on 246 randomly sampled cities 1505 
across the world (stratified by national wealth, population size, and Bailey’s Ecoregion) (Figure 1506 
3.5).126 1507 
 1508 
 1509 
 1510 
Figure 3.5 Annual mean PM2.5 concentration vs per capita GDP for 246 cities in the SHUE database. Colours 1511 
indicate WHO regions: blue – Africa; red – Europe; green – the Americas; Lime – Eastern Mediterranean; 1512 
orange – Western Pacific; purple – South East Asia. The dotted line marks the WHO recommended guidance 1513 
level of 10 µg.m-3. 1514 
 1515 
PM2.5 levels in the majority of global cities are currently well above the WHO’s annual guideline level 1516 
of 10 µg.m-3, with particularly high levels in cities in central, South and East Asia. Of almost 3,000 1517 
cities in the WHO database, levels in 71.2% are above the guideline level. However, since monitoring 1518 
is more common in high income settings, this is likely to represent an underestimation; for 1519 
randomly-selected cities in the SHUE database, 87.3% of cities are above the guideline. The data 1520 
suggests that air pollution levels have generally decreased in high income settings over recent 1521 
decades, although it has marginally increased, globally.127 1522 
Panel 3.1. Energy and Household Air Pollution in Peru. 1523 
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Universal access to energy is a major challenge in most LMICs and access to clean energy or energy 1524 
sources that do not adversely affect health is a considerable problem. In Peru, low-income families 1525 
spend a higher percentage (5%-18%) of average monthly income on energy services than those with 1526 
higher-incomes.128 Furthermore, a large portion of Peru’s rural population (83%) use firewood, dung, 1527 
or coal for cooking, making indoor air pollution one of the main environmental risk factors 1528 
experienced.129 1529 
Since the 1990s, the Peruvian government and various NGOs have promoted programmes and 1530 
policies oriented towards addressing the problem of solid fuels’ use for lighting, cooking and heating 1531 
and lack of access to energy sources in low-income sectors. In 2009, legislative changes enabled sub-1532 
national governments to invest up to 2.5% of the national mining revenues in improved cook stove 1533 
(ICS) deployment, resulting in more than 280,000 ICS installed nationwide (52% public and 43% 1534 
private) as part of the multi-sectorial campaign “Half Million ICS for a Smokeless Peru”. This 1535 
campaigned to help improve quality of life and health through the instalment of certified ICS.  1536 
Studies show that well-kept and certified ICS can reduce personal exposure to particulate matter 1537 
(PM2.5).  1538 
Peru released its 2010-2040 National Energy Policy in 2010. Of the nine goals, two discuss access to 1539 
energy services to low-income sectors. Special programmes have been developed in rural high 1540 
altitude and Amazonian regions in Peru to address energy access issues. In 2012, programmes were 1541 
established to substitute kerosene and other contaminating stoves with liquefied petroleum gas 1542 
(LPG) and ICS; and the Social Inclusion Energy Fund (FISE) was established, promoting access to LPG 1543 
for the most vulnerable populations through subsidies. By 2015, according to FISE, more than 1.3 1544 
million families had received an LPG stove, mitigating 91% of their CO2 emissions and leading to a 1545 
corresponding reduction of 553,000 tons of CO2 in using cleaner sources of energy.130,131 1546 
 1547 
3.5.2: Sectoral contributions to air pollution 1548 
The energy sector –both production and use - is the single largest source of man-made air pollution 1549 
emissions, producing 85% of particulate matter and almost all of the sulphur oxides and nitrogen 1550 
oxides emitted around the world (Figure 3.6).112 1551 
 1552 
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Figure 3.6 Selected primary air pollutants and their sources globally in 2015.112 (Source: IEA, 2016) 1553 
 1554 
Of this, coal power is responsible for three-quarters of the energy production and use sector’s 1555 
Sulphur Dioxide (SO2) emissions, 70% of its Nitrogen Oxide (NOx) emissions and more than 90% of its 1556 
PM2.5 emissions.112 However, over the past decade, these emissions have largely decoupled from 1557 
increases in coal-fired generation in several geographies, due to the introduction of emission 1558 
standards for coal power plants.132,133 1559 
In 2015, manufacturing and other industries (for example, refining and mining) were responsible for 1560 
about half of global energy-related emissions of SO2 as well as 30% of both NOx (28 Mt) and PM2.5.112 1561 
Furthermore, transport was responsible for around half of all energy-related NOx emissions in 2015 1562 
as well as 10% of PM2.5. Within this sector, road vehicles were by far the largest source of the 1563 
sector’s NOx and PM2.5 emissions (58% and 73%, respectively), while the largest portion of SO2 1564 
emissions came from shipping.112 Trends in NOx emissions from the transport sector (1990 to 2010) 1565 
are shown in Figure 3.7. 1566 
 1567 
a)  1568 
b)  1569 
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Figure 3.7 a) Energy related PM2.5 emissions in 2015 and b) NOx emissions from transport from 1990-2010 by 1570 
region.112 (Created using IEA, 2016 data) 1571 
 1572 
3.5.3: Premature mortality from ambient air pollution by sector 1573 
The extent to which emissions of different pollutants from different sectors contribute to ambient 1574 
PM2.5 levels depends on atmospheric processes, such as the dispersion of primary particles and the 1575 
formation of secondary aerosols from precursor emissions. Sources with low stack heights located 1576 
close to populations, such as household combustion for cooking and heating as well as road vehicles, 1577 
typically play a disproportionally larger role for total population exposure in relation to their 1578 
absolute emissions.  1579 
Long-term exposure to ambient PM2.5 is associated with increased mortality and morbidity from 1580 
cardiovascular and pulmonary diseases.134-136 A recent WHO assessment estimated that ambient air 1581 
pollution (AAP) is responsible for roughly three million premature deaths worldwide every year.137 1582 
As the sources of air pollution and greenhouse gases are overlapping in many cases, greenhouse gas 1583 
mitigation measures can have large co-benefits for human health. 1584 
Figure 3.8 shows an attribution of estimated premature mortality from AAP to the sources of 1585 
pollution as calculated in the GAINS model for the year 2015 in a set of South and East Asian 1586 
countries, using emissions data as published by the IEA.138 Here, the contributions of individual 1587 
source sectors to ambient PM2.5 concentrations have been calculated using linearized relationships 1588 
based on full atmospheric chemistry transport model simulations, and premature deaths are 1589 
calculated following the methodology used by the WHO and the GBD 2013 study.136,137  1590 
In some countries, such as China, North Korea and the Republic of Korea, agriculture is a large 1591 
contributor to premature deaths. Significant direct benefits for human health can therefore be 1592 
expected if these emission sources are addressed by climate policies. Significant benefits could also 1593 
be are available if, for instance, coal fired power plants were replaced by wind and solar. 1594 
Replacement of household combustion of coal, for example in China, would result in health benefits 1595 
not only from ambient (outdoor) but also household (indoor) exposure to air pollution. 1596 
 1597 
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Figure 3.8 Health impacts of exposure to ambient PM2.5 in terms of annual premature deaths per million 1598 
inhabitants in South and East Asian countries in 2015, broken down by key sources of pollution.  1599 
 1600 
 1601 
Transport Sector 1602 
Transportation systems – including road vehicles, rail, shipping, and aviation – are a key source of 1603 
GHG emissions, contributing 14% of global emissions in 2010.111,112 In order to meet the 2°C target, 1604 
the global transport sector must reduce its total GHG emissions by more than 20% below current 1605 
levels, by 2050, and to be on a trajectory to zero carbon emissions in the second half of the 1606 
century.139 Compared to other energy demand sectors, key sub-sectors of transportation (urban 1607 
personal and freight transport, long distance road transport, shipping, short haul aviation, and long 1608 
haul aviation) are more difficult to decarbonise because of the high energy density of fossil fuels, 1609 
thus emissions reductions targets are lower for transport than the energy sector as a whole. 1610 
The transport sector is also a major source of air pollutants, including particulate matter, nitrogen 1611 
oxides, sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide, volatile organic compounds, and indirectly, ozone. 1612 
Furthermore, exposure to air pollution from road transport is particularly challenging in cities where 1613 
vehicles emit street-level air pollution. In turn, significant opportunities for health exist through the 1614 
reduction of GHG emissions from transport systems, both in the near-term through cleaner air and 1615 
increased physical activity, and the long-term through the mitigation of climate change. 1616 
 1617 
Indicator 3.6: Clean fuel use for transport 1618 
Headline Finding: Global transport fuel use (TJ) has increased by almost 24% since 1990 on a per 1619 
capita basis. While petrol and diesel continue to dominate, non-conventional fuels have been rapidly 1620 
expanding, with more than 2 million electric vehicles being sold between 2010 and 2016. 1621 
Fuels used for transport produce more than half the nitrogen oxides emitted globally and a 1622 
significant proportion of particulate matter.111,112 Switching to low-emission transport systems is an 1623 
important component of climate change mitigation and will help to reduce concentrations of most 1624 
ambient air pollutants. However, the transport sector’s extremely high reliance on petroleum-based 1625 
fuels makes this transition particularly challenging. 1626 
This indicator focuses on monitoring global trends in levels of fuel efficiency, and on the transition 1627 
away from the most polluting and carbon intensive transport fuels. More specifically, this indicator 1628 
follows the metric of fuel use for transportation on a per capita basis (TJ/person) by type of fuel. To 1629 
develop this indicator, the Lancet Countdown draws on transport fuel data from the IEA and 1630 
population data from the World Bank.112  1631 
While some transition away from carbon-intensive fuel use, towards increasing levels of fuel 1632 
efficiency has occurred in select countries, transport is still heavily dominated by gasoline and diesel. 1633 
Global transport fuel use has increased by almost 65% since 1970 on a per capita basis (Tj/person) 1634 
(Figure 3.9). However, non-conventional fuels (for example, electricity, biofuels, and natural gas) 1635 
have been rapidly gaining traction since the 2000s, with more than two million electric vehicles 1636 
having been sold around the globe since 2010, mostly in the US, China, Japan and some European 1637 
countries (Figure 3.10).140 These figures remain modest when compared to the overall number of 1638 
cars sold per year, 77 million in 2017, and the total global fleet of 1.2 billion cars.  1639 
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 1640 
 1641 
Figure 3.9 Per capita fuel use by type (TJ/person) for transport sector with all fuels. 1642 
  1643 
 1644 
Figure 3.10 Cumulative Global Electric Vehicle Sales. Note: BEV is Battery Electric Vehicle and PHEV is Plug-in 1645 
Hybrid Electric Vehicle.141,142 (Source: IEA, 2017) 1646 
 1647 
Indicator 3.7: Sustainable travel infrastructure and uptake 1648 
Headline Finding: Levels of sustainable travel appear to be increasing in many European cities, but 1649 
cities in emerging economies are facing sustainable mobility challenges. While levels of private 1650 
transport use remain high in many cities in the USA and Australia, evidence suggests that they are 1651 
starting to decline. 1652 
Global trends of population growth and increasing urbanization suggests that demand for mobility in 1653 
urban areas will increase. Moving from private motorized transport to more sustainable modes of 1654 
travel (such as public transport, walking and cycling) in urban areas not only helps to reduce 1655 
emissions from vehicles, but also has several health co-benefits. This indicator tracks trends in 1656 
sustainable travel infrastructure and uptake in urban areas. 1657 
Whilst this indicator would ideally track the proportion and distance of journeys undertaken by 1658 
different modes of transport over time, data availability for city-level trends in modal share is 1659 
particularly scarce. Therefore, the Lancet Countdown will instead present data for selected locations, 1660 
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across a limited time-scale. Figure 3.11 presents data on current modal shares (i.e. recent year 1661 
estimates of the proportion of trips by different modes of transport) in world cities (see Appendix 4 1662 
for details). The data, collated by the Land Transport Authority come from travel surveys of 1663 
individual cities and national census data (see Appendix 4 for details).143 1664 
 1665 
 1666 
Figure 3.11 Modal Shares in world cities. Note: ‘Other’ typically includes paratransit (transport for people with 1667 
disabilities) and/or electric bikes. 1668 
 1669 
Figure 3.12 collates data on trends in modal share in select cities, where data from at least three 1670 
time points (including one pre-2000 time point) is available. While many cities have started to collect 1671 
this information in the past decade, there is a paucity of data on trends from before 2000, with 1672 
particularly wide gaps in data availability from cities in Asia, Africa and South America.144 1673 
In Berlin, London and Tokyo, the proportion of trips by privatised motor transport has slowly 1674 
declined since the late 1990s, while levels have remained high in Vancouver and Sydney and appear 1675 
to be increasing in Santiago. Levels of cycling are generally low, but appear to be increasing in many 1676 
cities.   1677 
Public transport in emerging cities is often insufficient, inefficient and in poor condition, potentially 1678 
leading to further declines in sustainable travel in many rapidly growing cities in the future. 145 As 1679 
this transition occurs, ensuring the mistakes made in Organization for Economic Cooperation and 1680 
Development (OECD) countries are not repeated will be vital. In particular, it is critical to improve 1681 
walking and cycling environments, in order to both make these modes attractive choices and protect 1682 
road users from injury. Recent United Nations (UN) guidance recommends devoting 20% of 1683 
transport budgets to funding non-motorized transport at national and local levels in low- and 1684 
middle-income countries.146 1685 
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 1686 
Figure 3.12 Trends in modal share in selected cities. Note: Data from Santiago in 1991 represents travel on a 1687 
usual day; Data from Sydney represent Weekdays only; Cycling modal share in Sydney is <1%.147-156 (Figure 1688 
created using data from the following sources: Institute for Mobility Research (2016); Transport for London 1689 
(2016); NSW Department of Transport (1996); NSW Department of Transport (2003); NSW Department of 1690 
Transport (2009); NSW Department of Transport (2017); Translink (2012); Dictuc S.A. (1992); Rode et al (2015); 1691 
and City of Berlin (2013)) 1692 
 1693 
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Food and agriculture 1694 
The availability of food is central to human health. Its production, however, is also a major 1695 
contributor to climate change, with the agricultural sector alone contributing 19-29% of 1696 
anthropogenic GHG emissions globally.10,157 1697 
Dietary choices determine food energy and nutrient intake, which are essential for human health, 1698 
with inadequate and unhealthy diets associated with malnutrition and health outcomes including 1699 
diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, and some cancers. Globally, dietary risk factors were estimated to 1700 
account for over 10% of all Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) lost in 2013.158 A transition to 1701 
healthier diets, with reduced red and processed meat consumption, and higher consumption of 1702 
locally and seasonally produced fruits and vegetables, could provide significant emissions savings.159  1703 
Tracking progress towards more sustainable diets requires consistent and continuous data on food 1704 
consumption, and related GHG emissions throughout food product life cycles. This would require 1705 
annual nationally representative dietary survey data on food consumption. However, due to the 1706 
complexity and cost of such data collection, dietary surveys are available for a limited number of 1707 
countries and years only.160 Although efforts to compile data and ensure comparability are under 1708 
way, their current format is not suitable for global monitoring of progress towards optimal dietary 1709 
patterns in terms of health benefits of climate change mitigation.161,162 1710 
 1711 
Indicator 3.8: Ruminant meat for human consumption 1712 
Headline Finding: Globally, the amount of ruminant meat available for human consumption has 1713 
declined slightly from 12.09 kg/capita/year in 1990 to 11.23 in 2013; the proportion of energy 1714 
(kcal/capita/day) available for human consumption from ruminant meat as opposed to other sources 1715 
has declined marginally from 1.86% in 1990 to 1.65% in 2013. 1716 
This indicator focuses on ruminants because the production of ruminant meat, in particular cattle, 1717 
dominates GHG emissions from the livestock sector (estimated at 5.6-7.5 GtCO2e per year), and 1718 
consumption of red meat has known associations with adverse health outcomes.163It measures the 1719 
total amount of ruminant meat available for consumption, and the ratio of ruminant meat energy 1720 
supply to total energy supply. Together, these reflect the relative amount of high GHG emission 1721 
foods in the system (Figure 3.13).164-166 Assuming correlation between ruminant meat supply and 1722 
consumption, the indicator therefore also provides information on variations in certain diet-related 1723 
health outcomes (such as colorectal cancer and heart disease).167,168 This indicator should be viewed 1724 
in the context of the specific setting where this trend is examined (in some populations, meat 1725 
consumption is a main source of food energy and provides essential micronutrients, as well as 1726 
livelihoods). Data was constructed using data from the FAO food balance sheets, which comprises 1727 
national supply and utilisation accounts of primary foods and processed commodities.169 1728 
  63 
 1729 
Figure 3.13. The total amount of ruminant meat available for human consumption in kg/capita/year by WHO-1730 
defined regions. 1731 
The amount of ruminant meat available for consumption is high in the Americas and has remained 1732 
relatively stable across 1990-2013. In Europe, the amount of ruminant meat was relatively high in 1733 
1990, declined rapidly from 1990-2000 and has remained stable from 2000-2013. Amounts are more 1734 
moderate in Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean and have remained reasonably constant over 1735 
time; South East Asia and Western Pacific have low amounts but have been slowly increasing in the 1736 
Western Pacific since 1990. 1737 
  64 
 1738 
Figure 3.14 The proportion of energy (kcal/capita/day) available for human consumption from ruminant meat 1739 
vs from all food sources by WHO-defined regions. 1740 
The proportion of energy supply from ruminant meat has been markedly higher in the Americas than 1741 
other regions since the 1990s, although the trend has been decreasing over time (Figure 3.14). In 1742 
Europe, the proportion of energy from ruminant meat rapidly declined from 1990-2000 and has 1743 
continued to slowly decline. By contrast, the trend has been increasing in the Western Pacific, 1744 
possibly reflecting the increasing trend in beef consumption in China (16% annually).170 1745 
Healthcare sector  1746 
The healthcare sector is a considerable contributor to GHG emissions, and has both a responsibility 1747 
and an appreciable opportunity to lead by example in reducing its carbon footprint. In 2013, the 1748 
estimated US healthcare sector emissions were 655 MtCO2e, which exceeded emissions of the entire 1749 
UK.171 GHG emissions in the healthcare sector illustrate an obvious externality which contributes to 1750 
climate change, contradicting the sector’s aim of improving population health.  1751 
The World Bank estimates that a 25% reduction from existing healthcare emissions in Argentina, 1752 
Brazil, China, India, Nepal, Philippines, and South Africa would equate to 116-194 million metric tons 1753 
of CO2e emission reduction, in other terms equal to decommissioning of 34-56 coal fired power 1754 
plants or removing 24-41 million passenger vehicles from the road.171  1755 
 1756 
Indicator 3.9: Healthcare sector emissions 1757 
Headline Finding: Whilst no systematic global standard for measuring the greenhouse gas emissions 1758 
of the healthcare sector currently exists, a number of healthcare systems in the UK, US, and around 1759 
the world are working to reduce their contribution to climate change. 1760 
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Several health sector emission reduction targets can be highlighted as positive examples. The 1761 
National Health Service (NHS) in the UK set an ambitious target of 34% health-system wide GHG 1762 
emission reduction by 2020; Kaiser Permanente in the U.S. has set 2025 as a target to become net 1763 
carbon positive; the Western Cape Government health system in South Africa committed to 10% 1764 
emission reduction by 2020 and 30% by 2050 in government hospitals; and Albert Einstein Hospital 1765 
in Sao Paulo, Brazil, has reduced its annual emissions by 41%.171 1766 
In the UK, comprehensive GHG emissions reporting was facilitated by the centralized structure of the 1767 
NHS. The Sustainable Development Unit (SDU) of the NHS has been monitoring GHG emissions from 1768 
a 1992 baseline, including major contributions from procurement of pharmaceuticals and other 1769 
products. NHS emissions reduced by 11% from 2007 to 2015, despite an 18% increase in activity.172 1770 
Mitigation efforts from the healthcare sector provide remarkable examples of hospitals and health 1771 
care systems leading by example, yielding impressive financial savings and health benefits for their 1772 
patients. To this end, the efforts of the hospitals, governments, and civil society organisations driving 1773 
this work forward must be supported and redoubled, ensuring a full transition to a healthier, more 1774 
sustainable model of climate-smart, and increasingly carbon neutral healthcare.171 1775 
Monitoring healthcare system emissions is an essential step towards accounting for the externality 1776 
of these emissions. Comprehensive national GHG emissions reporting by the healthcare system is 1777 
currently only routinely performed in the UK. Elsewhere, select healthcare organisations, facilities, 1778 
and companies provide self-reported estimates of emissions, however this is rarely standardized 1779 
across sites. The Lancet Countdown will continue to work on developing a standardised indicator on 1780 
health sector emissions for subsequent reports. 1781 
 1782 
Conclusion 1783 
The indicators presented in this section have provided an overview of activities relevant to public 1784 
health for the energy, transport, food and healthcare sectors’ mitigation. They have been selected 1785 
for their relevance to both climate change and human health and wellbeing.  1786 
A number of areas show remarkable promise – each of which should yield impressive benefits for 1787 
human health. However, these positive examples must not distract from the enormity of the task at 1788 
hand. The indicators presented in this section serve as a reminder of the scale and scope of 1789 
increased ambition required to meet commitments under the Paris Agreement. They demonstrate a 1790 
world which is only just beginning to respond to climate change, and hence only just unlocking the 1791 
opportunities available for better health. 1792 
 1793 
  1794 
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4. Finance & Economics 1795 
 1796 
Introduction 1797 
Interventions to protect human health from climate change risks have been presented above. This 1798 
section focuses on the economic and financial mechanisms necessary for them to be implemented, 1799 
and their implications. Some the indicators here do not have an explicit link to human health, and yet, 1800 
investment in renewable energy and a declining investment in coal capacity, for instance, is essential 1801 
in displacing fossil fuels and reducing their two principal externalities – the social cost of climate 1802 
change and the health costs from air pollution. Other indicators, such as economic and social losses 1803 
from extreme weather events, have more explicit links to human wellbeing. 1804 
The 2006 Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change estimated that the impacts of climate 1805 
change would cost the equivalent of reducing annual global Gross World Product (GWP) – the sum 1806 
of global economic output – by “5-20% now, and forever”, compared to a world without climate 1807 
change.173 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) AR5 estimates an aggregate loss 1808 
of up to 2% GWP even if the rise in global mean temperatures is limited to 2.5°C above pre-industrial 1809 
levels.22 However, such estimates depend on numerous assumptions, such as the rate at which 1810 
future costs and benefits are discounted. Further, existing analytical approaches are poorly suited to 1811 
producing estimates of the economic impact of climate change, and hence their magnitude is likely 1812 
greatly underestimated.174 175  In the presence of such uncertainty, with potentially catastrophic 1813 
outcomes, risk minimisation through stringent emissions reduction seems the sensible course of 1814 
action.  1815 
The indicators in this section, which seek to track flows of finance and impacts on the economy and 1816 
social welfare resulting from (in)action on climate change, fall into four broad themes: investing in a 1817 
low-carbon economy; the economic benefits of tackling climate change; pricing GHG emissions from 1818 
fossil fuels; and adaptation financing. The indicator presented are: 1819 
4.1 Investments in zero-carbon energy and energy efficiency 1820 
4.2 Investment in coal capacity 1821 
4.3 Funds divested from fossil fuels 1822 
4.4 Economic losses due to climate-related extreme events 1823 
4.5 Employment in low-carbon and high-carbon industries 1824 
4.6 Fossil fuel subsidies 1825 
4.7 Coverage and strength of carbon pricing 1826 
4.8 Use of carbon pricing revenues 1827 
4.9 Spending on adaptation for health and health-related activities 1828 
4.10 Health adaptation funding from global climate financing mechanisms 1829 
  1830 
Appendix 5 provides more detailed discussion of the data and methods used. 1831 
 1832 
 1833 
  67 
Indicator 4.1: Investments in zero-carbon energy and energy efficiency 1834 
Headline Finding: Proportional investment in renewable energy and energy efficiency increased in 1835 
2016, whilst absolute and proportional investment in fossil fuels decreased, and crucially, ceased to 1836 
account for the majority of annual investments in the global energy system. 1837 
This indicator tracks the level of global investment in zero-carbon energy and energy efficiency in 1838 
absolute terms, and as a proportion of total energy system investment. Figure 4.1 illustrates the data 1839 
for 2015 and 2016; the data for this indicator is sourced from the IEA.176,177 1840 
 1841 
Figure 4.1 Annual Investment in the Global Energy System. 1842 
 1843 
In 2015, total investment in the energy system was around $1.83 trillion (in US$2016), accounting 1844 
for 2.4% of GWP. Renewables and nuclear comprised 19% of this investment, and energy efficiency 1845 
12%. Most investment (54%) was in fossil fuel infrastructure. Electricity networks accounted for the 1846 
remaining 15%. In 2016, total investment in the energy system reduced to around $1.68 trillion, 1847 
accounting for 2.2% of GWP. Although the absolute value of investment in renewables and nuclear 1848 
energy reduced slightly in absolute (real) terms, its proportional contribution increased to 20%. 1849 
Investment in energy efficiency increased in both absolute and proportional terms to 14%. Fossil fuel 1850 
infrastructure suffered a significant reduction in investment, ceasing to account for the majority of 1851 
investment (at 49%). Such trends broadly represent a continuation of the trends experienced 1852 
between 2014 and 2015.178 1853 
Investment in renewables and nuclear is driven by renewable electricity capacity (with over 87% of 1854 
investment by value in this category in 2016). This, in turn, is largely driven by investments in solar 1855 
PV and onshore wind. Solar PV capacity additions in 2016 were 50% higher than 2015 (reaching 1856 
record levels of 73GW), driven by new capacity in China, the USA and India. However, this was 1857 
coupled with just a 20% increase in investment, resulting from a 20% reduction in the cost of solar 1858 
PV units. By contrast, investments in onshore wind reduced by around 20% between 2015 and 2016, 1859 
largely driven by changes to incentive schemes and elevated wind power curtailment rates in China. 1860 
The increase in energy efficiency investment was driven by policies that shifted markets towards 1861 
more energy efficient goods (such as appliances and lighting) and buildings (along with the 1862 
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expansion of the construction industry), and an increase in the sales of energy efficient (and low-1863 
carbon) vehicles. Europe accounted for the largest proportion of spending on energy efficiency 1864 
(30%), followed by China (27%), driven by efficiency investments in the buildings and transport 1865 
sectors.177 1866 
The substantial reduction in fossil fuel infrastructure investment, both upstream (such as mining, 1867 
drilling and pipelines, which dominate fossil fuel investment) and downstream (such as fossil fuel 1868 
power plants) is driven by a combination of low (and reducing) fossil fuel prices and cost reductions 1869 
(particularly upstream, which have on average reduced by 30% since 2014).177 1870 
 1871 
In order to hold a 66% probability of remaining within 2°C of warming, it is estimated that average 1872 
annual investments in the energy system between 2016 and 2050 must reach $3.5 trillion, with 1873 
renewable energy investments increasing by over 150%, and energy efficiency increasing by around 1874 
a factor of ten.179 1875 
 1876 
Indicator 4.2: Investment in coal capacity 1877 
Headline Finding: Although investment in coal capacity has increased since 2006, in 2016 this trend 1878 
turned and declined substantially.  1879 
The combustion of coal is the most CO2-intensive method of generating of electricity..180This 1880 
indicator tracks annual investment in coal-fired power capacity. Figure 4.2 presents an index of 1881 
global annual investment in coal power generation capacity from 2006 to 2016, using IEA data.177 1882 
 1883 
Figure 4.2. Annual Investment in coal-fired power capacity. 1884 
 1885 
It is clear that global investment in coal-fired electricity capacity generally increased from 2006 to 1886 
2012, before returning to 2006 levels in 2013-14, and rebounding significantly to over 40% above 1887 
this level in 2015. This rapid growth was driven principally by China, which increased investment in 1888 
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coal-fired power capacity by 60% from 2014, representing half of all new global coal capacity in 2015 1889 
(with investment in India and other non-OECD Asia countries also remaining high).178 The 1890 
subsequent reduction in investment in 2016 was similarly driven by reduced investment in China, 1891 
due to overcapacity in generation, concerns about local air pollution and new government measures 1892 
to reduce new capacity additions and halt the construction of some plants already in progress.177 1893 
 1894 
Indicator 4.3: Funds divested from fossil fuels 1895 
Headline Finding: Global Value of Funds Committing to Divestment in 2016 was $1.24 trillion, of 1896 
which Health Institutions represent $2.4 billion; this represents a cumulative sum of $5.45 trillion 1897 
(with health accounting for $30.3 billion). 1898 
The fossil fuel divestment movement seeks to encourage institutions and investors to divest 1899 
themselves of assets involved in the extraction of fossil fuels. ‘Divestment’ is defined relatively 1900 
broadly, ranging from an organisation that has made a binding commitment to divest from coal 1901 
companies only, to those who have fully divested from any investments in fossil fuel companies and 1902 
have committed to avoiding such investments in future. Proponents cite divestment as embodying 1903 
both a moral purpose (for example, reducing the fossil fuel industry’s ‘social licence to operate’), and 1904 
an economic risk reduction strategy (for example, through reducing the investor’s exposure to the 1905 
risk of ‘stranded assets’). However, others believe active engagement between investors and fossil 1906 
fuel businesses is a more appropriate course of action (for instance, encouraging diversification into 1907 
less carbon-intensive assets, through stakeholder resolutions).181 1908 
This indicator tracks the global total value of funds committing to divestment in 2016, and the value 1909 
of funds committed to divestment by health institutions in 2016, which was $1.24 trillion, and $2.4 1910 
billion respectively. The values presented above are calculated from data collected and provided by 1911 
350.org. They represent the total assets (or assets under management (AUM)) for institutions that 1912 
have committed to divest in 2016, and thus do not directly represent the sums divested from fossil 1913 
fuel companies. It also includes only those institutions for which such information is publicly 1914 
available (or provided by the institution itself), with non-US$ values converted using the market 1915 
exchange rate when the commitment was made. 1916 
By the end of 2016, a total of 694 organisations with cumulative assets worth at least $5.45 trillion, 1917 
including 13 health organisations with assets of at least $30.3 billion, had committed to divestment. 1918 
From the start of January 2017 to the end of March 2017, a further 12 organisations with assets 1919 
worth $46.87 billion joined this total (including Australia’s Hospitals Contribution Fund – HCF – with 1920 
assets of $1.45 billion). 1921 
  1922 
Indicator 4.4: Economic losses due to climate-related extreme events 1923 
Headline Finding: In 2016, a total of 797 events resulted in $129 billion in overall economic losses, 1924 
with 99% of losses in low-income countries uninsured. 1925 
Climate change will continue to increase the frequency and severity of meteorological (tropical 1926 
storms), climatological (droughts) and hydrological (flooding) phenomena, across the world. As 1927 
demonstrated by indicator 1.4, the number of weather-related disasters has increased in recent 1928 
years. The number of people affected and the economic costs associated with this increase is 1929 
expected to have risen. This indicator tracks the number of events and the total economic losses 1930 
(insured and uninsured) resulting from such events. In addition to the health impacts of these 1931 
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events, economic losses (particularly uninsured losses) have potentially devastating impacts on 1932 
wellbeing and mental health.182 1933 
The data upon which this indicator is based is sourced from Munich Re.183 Economic losses (insured 1934 
and uninsured) refer to the value of physical assets, and do not include the economic value of loss of 1935 
life or ill health, or health and casualty insurance. Values are first denominated in local currency, 1936 
converted to US$ using the market exchange rate in the month the event occurred, and inflated to 1937 
US$2016 using country-specific Consumer Price Indices (CPI). This indicator and underlying data does 1938 
not seek to attribute events and economic losses to climate change per se, but may plausibly be 1939 
interpreted as showing how climate change is changing the frequency and severity of these events. 1940 
Figure 4.3 presents insured and uninsured economic losses resulting from all significant 1941 
meteorological, climatological and hydrological events across the world, from 2010 to 2016, by 1942 
country income group. An annual average of 700 events resulted in an annual average of $127 billion 1943 
in overall economic losses per year over this timeframe. Upper-middle and high-income countries 1944 
experienced around two-thirds of the recorded events and around 90% of economic losses, with 1945 
<1% attributable to those of low-income. The same ratios for the number of events and economic 1946 
losses between income groups is present in the data for the period 1990-2016, despite an increasing 1947 
trend in the total global number of events and associated total value of economic losses over this 1948 
period. 1949 
 1950 
 1951 
Figure 4.3 Economic Losses from Climate-Related Events – Absolute. 1952 
 1953 
However, the data in Figure Error! Reference source not found.3 does not indicate the relative scale 1954 
of impacts across different income groups. For example, although the majority of economic losses 1955 
have occurred in upper-middle and high-income countries, these countries are among the most 1956 
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populous, with more economically valuable property and infrastructure (in absolute terms). A rather 1957 
different picture emerges in Figure 4.4, which presents the data in terms of ‘intensity’ – insured and 1958 
uninsured economic losses per $1000 GDP (in US$2016). 1959 
 1960 
Figure 4.4 Economic Losses from Climate-Related Events - Intensity. 1961 
 1962 
Between 2010 and 2016, high and upper-middle income countries experienced the least average 1963 
annual economic loss as a proportion of GDP ($1.45/$1000 GDP and $1.95/$1000 GDP, respectively), 1964 
with low and lower-middle income countries subject to somewhat higher values ($2.65/$1000 GDP 1965 
and $2.3/$1000 GDP, respectively). Economic losses in low-income countries were more than three 1966 
times as high in 2016 than in 2010. However, for 1990-2016, average annual values vary significantly 1967 
(see Appendix 5 for the full dataset). Whilst high and upper-middle income countries maintain 1968 
relatively similar values ($1.60/$1000 GDP and $2.9/$1000 GDP, respectively), average annual 1969 
economic losses experienced by (particularly) low and lower-middle income countries increase 1970 
substantially (to $10.95/$1000 GDP and $4.22/$1000 GDP, respectively). 1971 
It is clear that, on average, lower income countries experience greater economic loss as a proportion 1972 
of GDP as a result of climate-related events than higher-income countries. However, a more striking 1973 
result is the difference in the proportion of economic losses that are uninsured. In high-income 1974 
countries, on average around half of economic losses experienced are insured. This share drops 1975 
rapidly to under 10% in upper-middle income countries, and to well under 1% in low-income 1976 
countries. Over the period 1990-2016, uninsured losses in low-income countries were on average 1977 
equivalent to over 1.5% of their GDP. For contrast, expenditure on healthcare in low-income 1978 
countries on average for the period 1995-2015 was equivalent to 5.3% of GDP.184 1979 
$0	
$1	
$2	
$3	
$4	
$5	
$6	
Lo
w
	In
co
m
e
	
Lo
w
er
-M
id
d
le
	
U
p
p
er
-M
id
d
le
	
H
ig
h
	In
co
m
e
	
Lo
w
	In
co
m
e
	
Lo
w
er
-M
id
d
le
	
U
p
p
er
-M
id
d
le
	
H
ig
h
	In
co
m
e
	
Lo
w
	In
co
m
e
	
Lo
w
er
-M
id
d
le
	
U
p
p
er
-M
id
d
le
	
H
ig
h
	In
co
m
e
	
Lo
w
	In
co
m
e
	
Lo
w
er
-M
id
d
le
	
U
p
p
er
-M
id
d
le
	
H
ig
h
	In
co
m
e
	
Lo
w
	In
co
m
e
	
Lo
w
er
-M
id
d
le
	
U
p
p
er
-M
id
d
le
	
H
ig
h
	In
co
m
e
	
Lo
w
	In
co
m
e
	
Lo
w
er
-M
id
d
le
	
U
p
p
er
-M
id
d
le
	
H
ig
h
	In
co
m
e
	
Lo
w
	In
co
m
e
	
Lo
w
er
-M
id
d
le
	
U
p
p
er
-M
id
d
le
	
H
ig
h
	In
co
m
e
	
2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	 2014	 2015	 2016	
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
	L
o
ss
e
s	
(U
S$
/$
1
0
0
0
	G
D
P
,	U
S$
2
0
1
6
)	
Insured	Losses	 Uninsured	Losses	
  72 
Indicator 4.5: Employment in low-carbon and high-carbon industries 1980 
Headline Finding: In 2016, global employment in renewable energy reached 9.8 million, with 1981 
employment in fossil fuel extraction trending down, to 8.6 million. 1982 
The generation and presence of employment opportunities in low- and high-carbon industries have 1983 
important health implications, both in terms of the safety of the work environment itself and 1984 
financial security for individuals and communities. As the low-carbon transition gathers pace, high-1985 
carbon industries and jobs will decline. A clear example is seen in fossil fuel extraction. Some fossil 1986 
fuel extraction activities, such as coal mining, have substantial impacts on human health. Coal mining 1987 
accidents led to over 1,000 deaths in 2008 in China alone (a rapid decline from nearly 5,000 in 2003), 1988 
with exposure to particulate matter and harmful pollutants responsible for elevated levels of 1989 
cardiovascular, respiratory and kidney disease, in coal mining areas.185-188 The low-carbon transition 1990 
is also likely to stimulate the growth of new industries and employment opportunities. With 1991 
appropriate planning and policy, the transition from employment in high-carbon to low-carbon 1992 
industries will yield positive consequences for human health. 1993 
This indicator tracks global employment levels in fossil fuel extraction industries (coal mining and oil 1994 
and gas exploration and production), and in renewable energy. Figure 4.5 presents these values for 1995 
2012-2016. The data for this indicator is sourced from International Renewable Energy Agency 1996 
(IRENA) (renewables), and IBIS World (fossil fuel extraction).189-191  1997 
 1998 
 1999 
Figure 4.5 Employment in Renewable Energy and Fossil Fuel Extraction. 2000 
 2001 
From a peak of 9.1 million in 2014, jobs in the global fossil fuel extraction industry reduced by 2002 
around 500,000 to 8.6 million in 2016. Reductions in the coal mining industry largely drove this 2003 
change, which was the result of a range of factors, including its substitution by lower-cost natural 2004 
gas in the power sector in many countries, reducing the demand for coal and leading to 2005 
overcapacity, industry consolidation, and the rising automation of extractive activities.191  2006 
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By contrast, employment in the renewable energy industry increased rapidly from over 7.1 million 2007 
jobs in 2012 to over 9.3 million in 2014, and reaching 9.8 million in 2016. This growth has largely 2008 
been driven by the solar PV industry, which added over 1.7 million jobs between 2012 and 2016. 2009 
Solar PV is now the largest renewable energy employer, overtaking bioenergy, which has 2010 
experienced a reduction of 250,000 jobs since 2012. 2011 
 2012 
Indicator 4.6: Fossil fuel subsidies 2013 
Headline Finding: In 2015, fossil fuel consumption subsidies followed a trend seen since 2012, 2014 
decreasing markedly to $327 billion, principally as a result of declining global oil prices. 2015 
The combustion of fossil fuels results in a variety of harmful consequences for human health, and 2016 
the presence of subsidies for fossil fuels, either for its production (such as fossil fuel extraction) or 2017 
consumption (such as regulated gasoline prices), artificially lowers prices, promoting 2018 
overconsumption. This indicator tracks the global value of fossil fuel consumption subsidies. Figure 2019 
4.6 illustrates the value of fossil fuel consumption subsidies for 2010-2016 using IEA data.178,192 2020 
 2021 
 2022 
Figure 4.6 Global Fossil Fuel Consumption Subsidies - 2010-2015. 2023 
 2024 
Despite rising from $444 billion in 2010 to a peak of $571 billion in 2012, fossil fuel consumption 2025 
subsidies have decreased markedly to $327 billion in 2015 (in US$2016). The principal driver for this 2026 
is the doubling in oil price between 2010 and 2012, after which it plateaued, before falling rapidly to 2027 
below 2010 levels from mid-2014. Fossil fuel consumption subsidies are typically applied in order to 2028 
moderate energy costs for low-income consumers (although in practice, 65% of such subsidies in 2029 
LMICs benefit the wealthiest 40% of the population).193 As such, rising oil (and other fossil fuel) 2030 
prices tend to increase subsidy levels, as the differences between market and regulated consumer 2031 
prices increase, and governments take further action to mitigate the impact on citizens. When fossil 2032 
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fuel prices decrease, the gap between market and regulated prices reduces, and governments can 2033 
reform fossil fuel subsidies whilst keeping overall prices relatively constant. 2034 
Between 2014 and 2015, several countries took advantage of this opportunity, particularly regarding 2035 
oil-based fuels, which accounted for over 60% of the reduction in total fossil fuel subsidies between 2036 
2012 and 2015 (followed by natural gas at around 25%). This included India, which in deregulating 2037 
diesel prices accounted for a $19 billion subsidy reduction between 2014 and 2015 (~13% of the 2038 
global total reduction), and the major oil and natural gas producing nations (including Angola, 2039 
Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela), in which reduced hydrocarbon revenue 2040 
created pressure for fiscal consolidation, and in turn for consumption subsidy reform.178 To 2041 
encourage the low-carbon transition, fossil fuel subsidies should be phased out as soon as possible. 2042 
The commitment made by the G7 in 2016 to achieve this goal by 2025 should be extended to all 2043 
OECD counties, and globally by 2030.194  2044 
 2045 
Indicator 4.7: Coverage and strength of carbon pricing 2046 
Headline Finding: So far in 2017, various carbon pricing mechanisms covered13.1% of global 2047 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions, up from 12.1% in 2016. This reflects a doubling in the number of 2048 
national and sub-national jurisdictions with a carbon pricing mechanism over the last decade. 2049 
This indicator tracks the extent to which carbon pricing instruments are applied around the world as 2050 
a proportion of total GHG emissions, and the weighted average carbon price such instruments 2051 
provide (Table 4.1). 2052 
 2053 
 2016 2017 
Global Emissions Coverage* 12.1% 13.1% 
Weighted Average Carbon 
Price of Instruments (current 
prices, US$) 
$7.79 $8.81 
Global Weighted Average 
Carbon Price (current prices, 
US$) 
$0.94 $1.12 
Table 4.1 Carbon Pricing - Global Coverage and Weighted Average Prices per tCO2e. *Global emissions 2054 
coverage is based on 2012 total anthropogenic GHG emissions.195 (Source: World Bank, 2017) 2055 
 2056 
Between 2016 and 2017, the proportion of global emissions covered by carbon pricing instruments, 2057 
and the weighted average price of these instruments (and thus the global weighted average price for 2058 
all anthropogenic GHG emissions), increased. This is due to the introduction of four new instruments 2059 
in 2017 (note, this data runs up to 1 April 2017) - the carbon taxes in Alberta, Chile and Colombia, 2060 
and an Emissions Trading System (ETS) in Ontario. As such, over 40 national and 25 sub-national 2061 
jurisdictions now put a price on at least some of their GHG emissions (with substantially varying 2062 
prices, from less than $1/tCO2e in Chongqing, to over $126/tCO2e in Sweden). The last decade has 2063 
seen a rapid increase in the number of carbon pricing instruments around the world, with the 2064 
number of jurisdictions introducing them doubling.196 Over 75% of the GHG emissions covered by 2065 
carbon pricing instruments are in HICs, with the majority of the remainder covered by the 8 pilot 2066 
pricing instruments in China (Figure 4.7). 2067 
  75 
The World Bank provides the data for this indicator.195,196 Prices for 2016 and 2017 are those as of 1 2068 
August 2016 and 1 April 2017, respectively. For 2017, the indicator includes only instruments that 2069 
had been introduced by 1 April 2017. Instruments without price data are excluded. 2070 
 2071 
 2072 
Figure 4.7 Carbon Pricing Instruments implemented, scheduled for implementation and under 2073 
consideration.196 (Source: World Bank, 2017) 2074 
 2075 
In total, a further 21 carbon pricing instruments are either scheduled for implementation, or are 2076 
under consideration. This includes the commencement of a national ETS in China expected in the 2077 
second half of 2017. Although this would replace the 8 pilot schemes currently in place in China, it 2078 
could expand their emissions coverage fourfold, surpassing the European ETS to become the largest 2079 
carbon pricing instrument in the world.196 2080 
 2081 
Indicator 4.8: Use of carbon pricing revenues 2082 
Headline Finding: 40% of government revenues generated from carbon pricing are spent on climate 2083 
change mitigation, totalling US$9 billion. 2084 
  76 
Carbon pricing instruments require those responsible for producing the emissions concerned to pay 2085 
for their emissions, in one form or another. In most cases this generates revenue for the 2086 
governments or authorities responsible for introducing the instrument. Such revenue may be put to 2087 
a range of uses, including investment in climate change mitigation or adaptation or environmental 2088 
tax reform (ETR), which involves shifting the burden of tax from negative activities, such as the 2089 
generation of pollution, to positive activities, such as labour or environmentally beneficial products 2090 
or activities. Such options may produce a ‘double dividend’ of environmental improvement with 2091 
social and economic benefits.197 This indicator tracks the total government revenue from carbon 2092 
pricing instruments, and how such income is allocated. 2093 
 Mitigation Adaptation 
Environmental 
Tax Reform 
(ETR) 
General 
Funds 
Total 
Revenue 
(US$2016) 
Proportion 
(%) 
40.4% 4% 19.5% 36.1% 
$22.31 
Billion Value 
(US$2016) 
$9.01 Billion $0.9 Billion $4.34 Billion $8.06 Billion 
 2094 
Table 4.2. Carbon Pricing revenues and allocation in 2016.195 (Source: World Bank, 2017) 2095 
 2096 
Tale 4.2 presents total government revenue generated by carbon pricing instruments in 2016, and 2097 
four categories of expenditure for this revenue. The largest expenditure category is climate change 2098 
mitigation, which is in receipt of over $9 billion annually in funds. Despite this, less than half of 2099 
revenue-generating instruments allocate revenue for mitigation.  2100 
ETR policies accounted for around 20% of revenue allocation in 2016. Just two instruments (the 2101 
Portuguese and British Colombia Carbon Taxes) allocate all their revenue to allowing revenue-neutral 2102 
reduction in other (for example, income) taxes, with another four allocating part of their revenue to 2103 
this purpose. By contrast, only four instruments do not have any revenue allocated to general 2104 
government funds (The British Colombian, Swiss, Japanese and Portuguese carbon taxes), with 11 2105 
instruments allocating all revenues to this category (reaching €8 billion – or more than a third – of 2106 
revenues generated in 2016). Data for individual carbon pricing instruments may be found in Appendix 2107 
5. 2108 
Data on revenue generated is provided by the World Bank, with revenue allocation information 2109 
obtained from various sources (see Appendix 5).195 Only instruments with revenue estimates, and only 2110 
revenue received by the administering authority before redistribution, are considered. Revenue must 2111 
be explicitly allocated to climate change mitigation or adaptation, or for ETR, to be considered in these 2112 
categories. If such explicit earmarking is not present, or no data is available, then revenue is assumed 2113 
to be allocated to general funds. 2114 
 2115 
Indicator 4.9: Spending on adaptation for health and health-related activities 2116 
Headline finding: Out of the world's total adaptation spend just 4.63% ($16.46 billion USD) is on 2117 
health and 13.3% ($47.29 billion USD) on health-related adaptation. 2118 
This indicator reports estimates of spending on health and health-related climate change adaptation 2119 
and resilience. Many adaptation activities within and beyond the formal health sector yield health 2120 
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co-benefits, which are important to understand and capture. Here, estimates of the total health and 2121 
health-related adaptation spending were derived from the Adaptation & Resilience to Climate 2122 
Change (A&RCC) dataset produced by kMatrix. This global dataset, covering financial transactions 2123 
relevant to climate change adaptation, was compiled from a relevant subset of over 27,000 2124 
independent databases and sources (such as public disclosures and reports from insurance 2125 
companies, the financial sector, and governments).198 In this case, entries were triangulated 2126 
between at least seven independent sources before being included. 2127 
Examples of transactions captured here range from the procurement of goods or services (for 2128 
example, purchasing sandbags for flood levees) through to spending on research and development 2129 
(for example, for vulnerability and adaptation assessments) or staff training.198 Each of these 2130 
‘adaptation activities’ are grouped in to eleven sectors: Agriculture and Forestry, Built Environment, 2131 
Disaster-Preparedness, Energy, Health, ICT, Natural Environment, Professional Services, Transport, 2132 
Waste, and Water. Whilst adaptation spending relevant directly to the formal health sector is clearly 2133 
important (the ‘health’ category), interventions outside of the healthcare system will also yield 2134 
important benefits for health and wellbeing. ‘Health-related adaptation spending’ was defined as 2135 
that which additionally included adaptation spending from the agricultural sector (due to the 2136 
centrality of food and nutrition to health) and disaster preparedness sector (due to the direct public 2137 
health benefits that often result from these efforts). 2138 
This data from the A&RCC dataset is reported here, showing health and health-related adaptation 2139 
spending for 180 countries for the 2015-2016 financial year. Global health adaptation spending for 2140 
the financial year 2015-2016, calculated in this way, totalled 16.46 billion USD, representing 4.63% of 2141 
the global aggregate adaptation spend. Health-related adaptation spending totalled 47.29 billion 2142 
USD, or 13.3% of the global total adaptation spend (Figure 4.8). 2143 
Health-related adaptation and resilience spending, both national totals and per capita levels, is 2144 
extremely low in low-income countries, and increase across the continuum towards high-income 2145 
countries. Interestingly, health and health-related adaptation spending as a proportion of total 2146 
adaptation spending is relatively constant across income groups. 2147 
 2148 
 2149 
Figure 4.8 For the financial year 2015-2016. 4.8a) Total health and health-related adaptation spending and 2150 
4.8b) health and health-related adaptation and resilience to climate change (A&RCC) spending as a proportion 2151 
of GDP. All plots are disaggregated by World Bank Income Grouping. 2152 
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 2153 
 2154 
It is important to note that further work is required to more completely determine what should be 2155 
considered as ‘health-related adaptation spending’. Spending for agriculture and disaster 2156 
preparedness were included here, however other forms of adaptation spending clearly have 2157 
important health implications. Second, only economic data relating to the financial year 2015-2016 2158 
was available, precluding time trend analysis. Third, since public sector transactions may not leave a 2159 
sufficient ‘footprint’ to be picked up by this methodology, adaptation spending data here may 2160 
exclude some public-sector spending.  2161 
 2162 
Indicator 4.10: Health adaptation funding from global climate financing mechanisms  2163 
Headline Finding: Between 2003 and 2017, 0.96% of total adaptation funding for development, 2164 
flowing through global climate change financing mechanisms, was dedicated to health adaptation. 2165 
The final indicator in this section is designed in parallel with indicator 4.9, and aims to capture 2166 
development funds available for climate change adaptation. It reports global financial flows 2167 
dedicated to health adaptation to climate change, moving through established global climate 2168 
financing mechanisms. Data was drawn from the Climate Funds Update (CFU), an independent 2169 
source which aggregates funding data from multilateral and bilateral development agencies since 2170 
2003.16,199 CFU data is presented in four categories (pledged, deposited, approved, and disbursed); 2171 
this indicator uses data designated as ‘approved’.  2172 
Between 2003 and 2017, only 0.96% of approved adaptation funding was allocated to health 2173 
adaptation, corresponding with a cumulative total of 39.55 million USD (Figure 4.9). Total global 2174 
adaptation funding peaked in 2013 at 910.36 million USD and declined thereafter. However, health-2175 
related adaptation funding reached its highest level in early 2017, resulting in the near-doubling in 2176 
the proportion of adaptation funding allocated to health. Panel 4.1 provides a brief overview of 2177 
growing interest in health and climate change from the international donor community. 2178 
 2179 
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 2180 
Figure 4.9 Year on year multilateral and bilateral funding for all adaptation projects and health adaptation 2181 
projects (2003 through May 2017). 2182 
 2183 
Panel 4.1 International Donor Action on Climate Change and Health. 2184 
In 2017, the World Bank released three independent reports on climate change and health, 2185 
articulating (i) a new action plan for climate change and health, (ii) geographic focus areas, and (iii) 2186 
new strategy for climate-smart healthcare. In addition to training staff and increasing government 2187 
capacity, the World Bank outlines an approach to ensuring that at least 20% of new World Bank 2188 
health investments are climate-smart by 2020, corresponding to as much as $1bn in new climate-2189 
smart health finance for countries. Other development institutions and foundations are also getting 2190 
involved. Two separate, major gatherings of public and private funders occurred in 2016 (May, 2191 
Helsinki) and 2017 (May, Chicago) toward establishing new channels for health and climate finance, 2192 
and a third is planned for late 2017 (October, Washington, DC). 2193 
Conclusion 2194 
The indicators presented in this section seek to highlight the status of the economics and finance 2195 
associated with climate change and health across four themes; investing in a low-carbon economy, 2196 
economic benefits of tackling climate change, pricing the GHG emissions from fossil fuels, and 2197 
adaptation financing.  2198 
Many of the trends show positive change over time, notably global investment in zero-carbon energy 2199 
supply, energy efficiency, new coal-fired electricity capacity, employment in renewable energy, and 2200 
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divestment in fossil fuels.  However, the rate of change is relatively slow, and must accelerate rapidly 2201 
to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement.  2202 
  81 
5. Public and Political Engagement 2203 
 2204 
Introduction 2205 
So far, this report has presented indicators on the health impacts of climate hazards; resilience and 2206 
adaptation to climate change; health co-benefits of climate change mitigation; and economics and 2207 
finance mechanisms that facilitate a transition to a low-carbon economy. 2208 
Policy change requires public support and government action. This is particularly true of policies with 2209 
the reach and impact to enable societies to transition to a low-carbon future.200 The overarching 2210 
theme of this section is therefore the importance of public and political engagement in addressing 2211 
health and climate change, and the consequent need for indicators that track engagement in the 2212 
public and political domains. 2213 
The aim is to track engagement with health and climate change in the public and political domains 2214 
and identify trends since 2007. In selecting indicators, priority has been given to high-level 2215 
indicators, which can be measured globally, tracked over time and provide a platform for more 2216 
detailed analysis in future Lancet Countdown reports. The indicators relate to coverage of health and 2217 
climate change in the media, science, and government. Search terms for the indicators are aligned 2218 
and a common time-period was selected for all indicators (2007-2016). The period runs from before 2219 
the resolution on health and climate change by the 2008 World Health Assembly, which marked a 2220 
watershed in global engagement in health and climate change; for the first time, member states of 2221 
the UN made a multilateral commitment to protect human health from climate change.201 2222 
The indicators presented are: 2223 
5.1. Media coverage of health and climate change 2224 
5.2. Health and climate change in scientific journals 2225 
5.3. Health and climate change in the United Nations General Assembly 2226 
 2227 
Corresponding Appendix 6 provide more detailed discussion of the data and methods used. 2228 
 2229 
Indicator 5.1: Media coverage of health and climate change  2230 
Headline Finding: Global newspaper coverage of health and climate change has increased 78% since 2231 
2007, with marked spikes in 2009 and 2015, coinciding with the 15th and 21st Conference of the 2232 
Parties (COP). 2233 
Media plays a crucial role in communicating risks associated with climate change.202 Knowledge 2234 
about climate change is related to perceptions of risk and intentions to act.203,204 Public perceptions 2235 
of a nation’s values and identity are also an important influence on public support for national 2236 
action.205 Indicator 5.1 therefore tracks media coverage of health and climate change, with a global 2237 
indicator on newspaper coverage on health and climate change (5.1.1), complemented by an in-2238 
depth analysis of newspaper coverage on health and climate change for two national newspapers 2239 
(5.1.2). 2240 
 2241 
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5.1.1: Global newspaper reporting on health and climate change 2242 
Focusing on English-language and Spanish-language newspapers, this indicator tracks global 2243 
coverage of health and climate change in high-circulation national newspapers from 2007 to 2016. 2244 
Using 18 high-circulation ‘tracker’ newspapers, global trends are shown and disaggregated regionally 2245 
to provide a global indicator of public exposure to news coverage of health and climate change. 2246 
Since 2007, newspaper coverage of health and climate change has risen globally by 78% (Figure 5.1). 2247 
However, this trend is largely driven by South-East Asian newspapers. Although mostly due to the 2248 
higher number of South-East Asian newspapers included in this analysis, the South-East Asian 2249 
newspapers here did have a higher than average coverage of health and climate change than other 2250 
regions, particularly among Indian sources (see Appendix 6). This generally high volume of coverage 2251 
in the Indian press can be attributed to the centrality of newspapers as communication channels for 2252 
elite-level discourse in India and to relatively high levels of climate change coverage throughout 2253 
Asia.206-208 For the Eastern Mediterranean, Americas, and Western Pacific, there is not a strong trend 2254 
in the media reporting. Some spikes are notable in 2009 in Europe, which is largely maintained for 2255 
the rest of the time series, and in the Americas, which drops until a secondary spike between 2012 2256 
and 2014. The first major spike globally was in 2009, coinciding with COP15 (Conference of the 2257 
Parties) in Copenhagen, for which there was high expectation. Newspaper reporting then dropped 2258 
around 2010, but since 2011 has been rising overall globally. 2259 
 2260 
 2261 
Figure 5.1 Newspaper reporting on health and climate change (for 18 newspapers) from 2007 to 2016, broken 2262 
down by WHO region. 2263 
 2264 
Data was assembled by accessing archives through the Lexis Nexis, Proquest and Factiva databases. 2265 
These sources were selected through the weighting of four main factors: geographical diversity 2266 
(favouring a greater geographical range), circulation (favouring higher circulating publications), 2267 
national sources (rather than local/regional), and reliable access to archives over time (favouring 2268 
those accessible consistently for longer periods). Search terms were aligned to those used for the 2269 
indicators of scientific and political engagement and searches, with Boolean searches done in English 2270 
and Spanish. 2271 
 2272 
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5.1.2: In-depth analysis of newspaper coverage on health and climate change 2273 
The second part of this indicator provides an analysis of two national newspapers; Le Monde 2274 
(France) and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) (Germany). Le Monde and FAZ were chosen for 2275 
this analysis, as these are leading newspapers in France and Germany; two countries with political 2276 
weight in Europe. Both newspapers continue to set the tone of public debates in France and 2277 
Germany.209,210 2278 
Only a small proportion of articles on climate change mentioned the links between health and 2279 
climate change: 5% in Le Monde and 2% in FAZ. The analysis also pointed to important national 2280 
differences in reporting on health and climate change. For example, in France, 70% of articles 2281 
referring to health and climate change represented the health-climate change nexus as an 2282 
environmental issue, whereas in Germany articles had a broader range of references: the economy 2283 
(23%), local news (20%) and politics (17%). The recommended policy responses also differed; in Le 2284 
Monde, the emphasis was on adaptation (41% of articles), while FAZ put more emphasis on 2285 
mitigation (40% of articles). The co-benefits that public health policies can represent for mitigation 2286 
were mentioned by 17% of Le Monde articles and 9% of FAZ articles.  Overall, the analysis points to 2287 
the marked differences in media reporting of health and climate change, and therefore in the 2288 
information and perspectives to which the public is exposed (see Appendix 6 for details). 2289 
 2290 
Indicator 5.2: Health and climate change in scientific journals 2291 
Headline Finding: Since 2007, the number of scientific papers on health and climate change has more 2292 
than trebled. 2293 
Science is critical to increasing public and political understanding of the links between climate 2294 
change and health; informing mitigation strategies; and accelerating the transition to low-carbon 2295 
societies.211,212 This indicator, showing scientific engagement with health and climate change, tracks 2296 
the volume of peer-reviewed publications in English-language journals from PubMed and Web of 2297 
Science (see Appendix 6 for details). The results show there has been a marked increase in published 2298 
research on health and climate change in the last decade, from 94 papers in 2007 to over 275 2299 
published in both 2015 and 2016. Within this overall upward trend, the volume of scientific papers 2300 
increased particularly rapidly from 2007-2009 and from 2012, with a plateauing between these 2301 
periods (Figure 5.2). 2302 
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 2303 
Figure 5.2 Number of scientific publications on climate change and health per year (2007-2016) from PubMed 2304 
and Web of Science journals. 2305 
 2306 
The two periods of growth in scientific outputs coincided with the run-up to the UNFCCC COPs held 2307 
in Copenhagen in 2009 (COP15) and in Paris in 2015 (COP21). This pattern suggests that scientific 2308 
and political engagement in health and climate change are closely linked, with the scientific 2309 
community responding quickly to the global climate change agenda and the need for evidence.  2310 
Most publications focus on the impacts of climate change and health in Europe and North America. 2311 
Overall, more than 2000 scientific articles were identified, of which 30% of papers focussed on 2312 
Europe, followed by 29% on the Americas. Within the Americas, the large majority (72%) of the 2313 
papers related to health and climate change in North America (see Figure S5.1 in Appendix 6). By 2314 
contrast, only 10% of published articles had a focus on Africa or the Eastern Mediterranean Region, 2315 
demonstrating a marked global inequality in the science of health and climate change (see Figures 2316 
S5.1 and S5.2 in Appendix 6). 2317 
Among the journals in the analysis, infectious diseases, particularly dengue fever and other 2318 
mosquito-transmitted infections, are the most frequently investigated health outcomes; 2319 
approximately 30% of selected papers covered these health-related issues. Important gaps in the 2320 
scientific evidence base were identified, including migration and mental ill-health. 2321 
For this indicator, a scoping review of peer-reviewed articles on health and climate change, 2322 
published in English between 2007 and 2016, was conducted; an appropriate approach for broad 2323 
and inter-disciplinary research fields.213 Two databases were used, PubMed and Web of Science, to 2324 
identify papers through a bibliometric analysis using keyword searches (see Appendix 6 for 2325 
details).214 Inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied to capture the most relevant literature on 2326 
the human health impacts of climate change within the chosen timeframe and papers were 2327 
independently reviewed and screened three times to identify relevant publications.215 2328 
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Indicator 5.3: Health and climate change in the United Nations General Assembly 2330 
Headline Finding: There is no overall trend in United Nations General Debate (UNGD) references to 2331 
health and climate change, but two significant peaks occurred in 2009 and 2014. 2332 
The General Debate (GD) takes place every September at the start of each new session of the United 2333 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Governments use their annual statements to present their 2334 
perspective on events and issues they consider the most important in global politics, and to call for 2335 
greater action from the international community. All UN Member States can address the UNGA, free 2336 
from external constraints. Therefore, GD statements provide an ideal data source on political 2337 
engagement with health and climate change, which is comparable spatially and temporally. This 2338 
indicator focuses on the extent to which governments refer to linkages between health and climate 2339 
change issues in their annual statements in the GD, with one reference representing one ‘hit’. 2340 
Health and climate change are issues frequently raised in UNGD statements (see Figures S5.3-S5.5 in 2341 
Appendix 6). However, statements less frequently link health and climate change together. Between 2342 
2007 and 2016, linked references to health and climate change in the annual UNGD ranged from 44 2343 
to 124 (Figure 5.3). The comparable figures for references to climate change alone were 378 and 2344 
989. It was found that there is no overall trend in conjoint references to health and climate change 2345 
across the period. 2346 
 2347 
Figure 5.3 Political engagement with the intersection of health and climate change, represented by joint 2348 
references to health and climate change in the UNGD. 2349 
 2350 
While no overall trend is apparent, there are two distinct peaks between 2009 and 2011 and in 2351 
2014. In both 2009 and 2014, there were 124 references linking health and climate change in the GD 2352 
statements. The 2009 peak occurred after the 2008 World Health Day, which focussed on health and 2353 
climate change, and in the build-up to COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009. The 2014 peak is indicative of 2354 
the influence of the large UNGA on climate change in 2014 and the lead up to COP21 in Paris in 2355 
2015. 2356 
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The 2015 UNGA, which focused on the Sustainable Development Goals, made relatively limited 2357 
reference to climate change, and, after the 2014 peak, conjoint references to health and climate 2358 
change declined. This irregular pattern points to the importance of key events in the global 2359 
governance of health and climate change in driving high-level political engagement.  2360 
There are country-level differences in the attention given to health and climate change in UNGD 2361 
statements (Figure 5.4). More frequent reference is made to the issue by countries in the Western 2362 
Pacific, particularly by the SIDS in these regions. In contrast, governments in the East Mediterranean, 2363 
the Americas and South-East Asia tend to make fewer references to health and climate change. 2364 
 2365 
Figure 5.4 Regional political engagement with the intersection of health and climate change, represented by 2366 
joint references to health and climate change in the UNGD, broken down by WHO region. 2367 
 2368 
This indicator is based on the application of keyword searches in the text corpus of debates. A new 2369 
dataset of GD statements was used (UNGD corpus), in which the annual UNGD statements have 2370 
been pre-processed and prepared for use in quantitative text analysis (see Appendix 6 for details).216  2371 
 2372 
Conclusion 2373 
The indicators in this section have demonstrated the importance of global governance in mobilising 2374 
public and political engagement in health and climate change. The UN (and particularly the annual 2375 
COPs) have a significant role here, clearly influencing media, scientific and political engagement with 2376 
health and climate change.  2377 
To further improve understanding of public and political engagement, indicators relating to national 2378 
governments’ health and climate change legislation, private sector engagement, the inclusion of 2379 
climate change in professional health education, and the prominence given to health in UNFCCC 2380 
negotiations are proposed for future analysis. The previous sections in this report have presented 2381 
findings on the impacts of climate hazards, adaptation and resilience, co-benefits of mitigation, and 2382 
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finance and economics. All of these hinge upon policy, which in turn is dependent upon public and 2383 
political engagement.  2384 
  88 
Conclusion - the Lancet Countdown in 2017 2385 
In June 2015, the Lancet Commission laid the groundwork for its global monitoring platform, 2386 
designed to systematically track progress on health and climate change, and hold governments to 2387 
account for their commitments under the then to-be-finalised Paris Agreement.4 The Lancet 2388 
Countdown will continue this work, reporting annually on the indicators presented in this report and 2389 
on new indicators in future. 2390 
 2391 
The direction of travel is set 2392 
The data and analysis presented in this 2017 report cover a wide range of topics and themes from 2393 
the lethality of weather-related disasters, to the phase-out of coal-fired power. The report begins 2394 
with an indicator set dedicated to tracking the health effects of climate change and climate hazards. 2395 
The analysis here demonstrates that the symptoms of climate change have been clear for a number 2396 
of years, with the health impacts far worse than previously understood. These effects have been 2397 
spread unequally, with a 9.4% increase in vectorial capacity of the dengue fever carrying Aedes 2398 
aegypti predominantly spreading to low- and middle-income countries since 1950; and India 2399 
disproportionately affected by the additional 75 million exposure events to potentially fatal 2400 
heatwaves since 2000.  2401 
These indicators also suggest that populations are beginning to adapt, with improvements in the 2402 
world’s overall health profile strengthening its resilient capacity, and national governments 2403 
beginning to invest in health adaptation planning for climate change. This is supported by some 2404 
$47.29 billion USD spent annually on health-related adaptation (some 13.3% of global total 2405 
adaptation spend). However, the academic literature and past experience make it clear that there 2406 
are very real and immediate technological, financial, and political barriers to adaptation.10  2407 
The indicators in the third section track health-relevant mitigation trends across four sectors, with an 2408 
ultimate focus of keeping temperature rise “well below 2°C” and meeting the Paris Agreement. At an 2409 
aggregate level, the past two decades have seen limited progress here, with many of the trends and 2410 
indicators remaining flat or moving strongly in the opposite direction. More recently, trends in the 2411 
electricity generation (deployment of renewable energy and a dramatic slow-down in coal-fired 2412 
power) and transport sectors (soon-to-be cost parity of electric vehicles with their petrol-based 2413 
equivalents) provide cause for optimism, which, if sustained, could reflect the beginning of system-2414 
wide transformation.  2415 
Indicators in the fourth and fifth sections underpin and drive forward this transition. Again, trends 2416 
across the last two decades reflect concerning levels of inaction, with accelerated investment and 2417 
intervention seen in more recent years. They reflect record levels of employment in the renewable 2418 
energy sector to overtake those in fossil fuel extraction, and a global reduction in fossil fuel 2419 
consumption subsidies. Carbon pricing mechanisms are slowly widening and now cover some 13.1% 2420 
of global CO2 emissions. The final section considers the degree to which the public, political and 2421 
academic communities have engaged with the links between climate change and health. It points to 2422 
uneven patterns of engagement and the vital role of global institutions, and the UN particularly, in 2423 
driving forward public, political and scientific support for enhanced mitigation and adaptation 2424 
policies. 2425 
Overall, the trends elucidated in the Lancet Countdown’s 2017 report provide cause for deep 2426 
concern, highlighting the immediate health threats from climate change and the relative inaction 2427 
seen across the world over the past two decades. However, they also point to more recent trends 2428 
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over the last five years demonstrating a rapid increase in action, which was solidified in the Paris 2429 
Agreement. These ‘glimmers of progress’ are encouraging, and reflect a growing political consensus 2430 
and ambition, which was seen in full-force in response to the US’s departure from the 2015 climate 2431 
change treaty. Whilst action needs to increase rapidly, taken together, this provides the clearest 2432 
signal to-date that the world is beginning to transition to a low-carbon world, that no one country or 2433 
head of state can halt this progress, and that from today until 2030, the direction of travel is set. 2434 
 2435 
 2436 
Contributors 2437 
The Lancet Countdown: Tracking Progress on Health and Climate Change is an international 2438 
academic collaboration which builds off the work of the 2015 Lancet Commission on Health and 2439 
Climate Change, convened by The Lancet. The Lancet Countdown’s work for this paper was 2440 
conducted by its five working groups, each of which were responsible for the design, drafting, and 2441 
review of their individual indicators and sections. All authors contributed to the overall paper 2442 
structure and concepts, and provided input and expertise to the relevant sections. Authors 2443 
contributing to Working Group 1: Jonathan Chambers; Peter M Cox; Mostafa Ghanei; Ilan Kelman; Lu 2444 
Liang; Ali Mohammad Latifi; Maziar Moradi-Lakeh; Kris Murray; Fereidoon Owfi; Mahnaz Rabbaniha; 2445 
Elizabeth Robinson; Meisam Tabatabaei. Authors contributing to Working Group 2: Sonja Ayeb-2446 
Karlsson; Peter Byass; Diarmid Campbell-Lendrum; Michael Depledge; , Paula Dominguez-Salas; 2447 
Howard Frumkin; Lucien Georgeson; Delia Grace; Anne Johnson; Dominic Kniveton; Georgina Mace; 2448 
Maquins Odhiambo Sewe; Mark Maslin; Maria Nilsson; Tara Neville; Karyn Morrissey; Joacim 2449 
Rocklöv; Joy Shumake-Guillemot. Authors contributing to Working Group 3: Markus Amann; Kristine 2450 
Belesova; Wenjia Cai; Michael Davies; Andy Haines; Ian Hamilton; Stella Hartinger; Gregor 2451 
Kiesewetter; Melissa Lott, Robert Lowe; James Milner; Tadj Oreszczyn; David Pencheon, Steve Pye; 2452 
Rebecca Steinbach; Paul Wilkinson. Authors contributing to Working Group 4: Timothy Bouley; Paul 2453 
Drummond; Paul Ekins. Authors Contributing to Working Group 5: Maxwell Boykoff; Meaghan Daly; 2454 
Niheer Dasandi; Anneliese Depoux; Antoine Flahault; Hilary Graham; Rébecca Grojsman; Slava 2455 
Mikhaylov; Stefanie Schütte. The coordination, strategic direction, and editorial support for this 2456 
paper was provided by Anthony Costello (Co-Chair), Hugh Montgomery (Co-Chair), Peng Gong (Co-2457 
Chair), Nick Watts (Executive Director), and Nicola Wheeler (Programme Officer). The findings and 2458 
conclusions in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official 2459 
position of World Health Organization, the World Bank, or the World Meteorological Organization. 2460 
 2461 
Declarations of Interest 2462 
The Lancet Countdown’s work is supported by an unrestricted grant from the Wellcome Trust (ref: 2463 
200890/Z/16/Z)). The Lancet Countdown covered travel costs for meetings related to the 2464 
development of the paper. Seven of the authors (NWa, NWh, ML, PD, MB, MD and JC) were 2465 
compensated for their time while working on the Lancet Countdown’s drafting and development.  2466 
HM is a board member of the UK Climate and Health Council, an Advisory Board member of the 2467 
Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit, and is developing an air pollution mask (which represents no 2468 
conflict of interest). NWa reports being the Director of the UK Health Alliance on Climate Change. AJ 2469 
is a Governor of the Wellcome Trust, and a member of the Adaptation Sub-Committee of the 2470 
Committee on Climate Change. MA, SAK, KB, TB, PB, WC, DCL, AC, PC, ND, MDa, MDe, AD, PDS, PE, 2471 
AF, HF, LG, MG, PG, DG, HG, RG, AH, IH, SH, IK, GK, DK, LL, RL, GM, MM, SM, JM, AML, MML, KMo, 2472 
  90 
KMu, TN, MN, TO, FO, DP, SP, MR, ER, JR, SS, MS, JSG, RS, MT, and PW declare no conflicts of 2473 
interest. 2474 
 2475 
Acknowledgements 2476 
The Lancet Countdown would like to thank the Wellcome Trust, in particular Saskia Heijnen, Sarah 2477 
Molten and Sophie Tunstall-Behrens, for its financial and strategic support—without which, this 2478 
research collaboration would not be possible. While carrying out its work, the Lancet Countdown 2479 
received invaluable technical advice and input from a number of individuals, including Neil Adger 2480 
(University of Exeter), Kevin Andrews (University of Colorado Boulder), Nigel Arnell (University of 2481 
Reading), Rob Bailey (Chatham House), John Balbus (National Institute of Environmental Health 2482 
Sciences), Simon Bennet (International Energy Agency), Helen Berry (Australiana National 2483 
University), Kathryn Brown (Climate Change Committee), Yossi Cadan (350.org), Tony Capon 2484 
(University of Sydney), Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), Michelle Chan (Universidad Peruana 2485 
Cayetano Heredia), Lucia Fernandez (World Health Organization), Lauren Gifford (University of 2486 
Colorado Boulder), Francesca Harris (London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine), Mathieu 2487 
Hemono (Centre Virchow-Villermé), Niamh Herlihy (Centre Virchow-Villermé), Richard King 2488 
(Chatham House), Tord Kjellstrom (Australian National University), Noemie Klein (Ecofys), Long Lam 2489 
(Ecofys), Seline Lo (The Lancet), Rachel Lowe (London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine), Gesa 2490 
Luedecke (University of Colorado Boulder), Lucy McAllister (University of Colorado Boulder), Marisa 2491 
McNatt (University of Colorado Boulder), Jonathan Patz (University of Wisconsin-Madison), Sonia 2492 
Roschnik (Sustainable Health Solutions), Osman Sankoh (INDEPTH), Ami Nacu-Schmidt (University of 2493 
Colorado Boulder), Pauline Scheelbeek (London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine), Jan 2494 
Semenza (European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control), Imogen Tennison (National Health 2495 
Service), Hanna Tuomisto (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine), Armando Valdes 2496 
Valasquez (Universidad Peruana Cayetano Heredia) and Shelagh Whitley (Overseas Development 2497 
Institute). Administrative and communications support was provided by Richard Black (Energy and 2498 
Climate Intelligence Unit), Pete Chalkley (Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit), Tan Copsey (Climate 2499 
Nexus), Tom Fern, Jack Fisher (University College London), Sarah Hurtes (European Climate 2500 
Foundation), Paige Knappenberger (Climate Nexus) and George Smeeton (Energy and Climate 2501 
Intelligence Unit). Mr Georgeson wishes to express gratitude for funding from the Economic and 2502 
Social Research Council and the Natural Environment Research Council (grant number 2503 
ES/J500185/1). 2504 
The Lancet Countdown is funded through an unrestricted grant from the Wellcome Trust 2505 
(200890/Z/16/Z). 2506 
 2507 
 2508 
 2509 
 2510 
References 2511 
 2512 
  91 
1. Kang Y, Khan S, Ma X. Climate change impacts on crop yield, crop water productivity 2513 
and food security – A review. Progress in Natural Science 2009; 19(12): 1665–74. 2514 
2. Lindgren E, Andersson, Y, Suk, J.E, Sudre, B. and Semenza, J.C. Monitoring EU 2515 
Emerging Infectious Disease Risk Due to Climate Change. Science 2012; 336(6080): 418-9. 2516 
3. Reuveny R. Climate change-induced migration and violent conflict. Political 2517 
Geography 2007; 26(6): 656–73. 2518 
4. Watts N, et al. Health and climate change: policy responses to protect public health. 2519 
The Lancet 2015; 386(10006): 1861–914. 2520 
5. Watts N, et al. The Lancet Countdown: tracking progress on health and climate 2521 
change. The Lancet 2016; 389(10074): 1151–64. 2522 
6. World Health Organization. Second Global Conference: Health and Climate (Paris 7-8 2523 
July 2016), 2016. 2524 
7. United Nations Framework Convention on Change. Paris Agreement. In: United 2525 
Nations, editor. Paris, France; 2015. 2526 
8. United Nations Environment Program. The Emissions Gap Report 2016. In: United 2527 
Nations, editor. Nairobi, Kenya; 2016. 2528 
9. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Climate Change 2014: Impacts, 2529 
Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working 2530 
Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2531 
Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 2014. 2532 
10. Smith KR, Woodward A, Campbell-Lendrum D, et al. Human health: Impacts, 2533 
adaptation, and co-benefits. In: Field CB, Barros VR, Dokken DJ, et al., eds. Climate Change 2534 
2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects 2535 
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 2536 
Panel of Climate Change. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press; 2014: 709-2537 
54. 2538 
11. Berry HL, Bowen K, Kjellstrom T. Climate change and mental health: a causal 2539 
pathways framework. International Journal of Public Health 2010; 55(2): 123-32. 2540 
12. Reinmuth-Selzle K, et al. Air Pollution and Climate Change Effects on Allergies in the 2541 
Anthropocene: Abundance, Interaction, and Modification of Allergens and Adjuvants. 2542 
Environmental Science and Technology 2017; 51(8): 4119-41. 2543 
13. Glaser J, et al. Climate Change and the Emergent Epidemic of CKD from Heat Stress 2544 
in Rural Communities: The Case for Heat Stress Nephropathy. Clinical Journal of the 2545 
American Society of Nephrology 2016; 11(8): 1472–83. 2546 
14. McMichael AJ. Globalization, Climate Change, and Human Health. The New England 2547 
Journal of Medicine 2013; 368: 1335-43. 2548 
  92 
15. European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF). 2017. 2549 
https://www.ecmwf.int/. 2550 
16. European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF). Climate 2551 
Reanalysis. 2017. https://www.ecmwf.int/en/research/climate-reanalysis. 2552 
17. NASA. Gridded Population of the World (GPW), v4. 2017. 2553 
18. Jacob D, Petersen J, Eggert B, et al. EURO-CORDEX: new high-resolution climate 2554 
change projections for European impact research. Regional Environmental Change 2014; 2555 
14(2): 563-78. 2556 
19. HEAT-SHIELD. 2017. https://www.heat-shield.eu/. 2557 
20. Kjellstrom T, Briggs D, Freyberg C, Lemke B, Otto M, Hyatt O. Heat, Human 2558 
Performance, and Occupational Health: A Key Issue for the Assessment of Global Climate 2559 
Change Impacts. Annual Review of Public Health 2016; 37: 97–112. 2560 
21. Ijaz K, Kasowski E, Arthur RR, Angulo FJ, Dowell SF. International Health 2561 
Regulations—What Gets Measured Gets Done. Emerging Infectious Diseases 2012; 18(7): 2562 
1054-7. 2563 
22. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Climate Change 2014: Synthesis 2564 
Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 2565 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. 2566 
Meyer (eds.)]. Geneva, Switzerland: IPCC, 2014. 2567 
23. Emergency Events Database. The Human Cost of Weather-Related Disasters 1995-2568 
2015: Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), 2015  2569 
24. Emergency Events Database. The International Disaster Database - Centre for 2570 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters. 2017. 2571 
25. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. World Disasters 2572 
Report 2014: Focus on Culture and Risks, 2014. 2573 
26. Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters. The Human Cost of Natural 2574 
Disasters: A Global Perspective. Brussels: CRED (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of 2575 
Disasters), 2015. 2576 
27. Global Burden of Disease. Global Burden of Disease Study 2015. Global Burden of 2577 
Disease Study 2015 (GBD 2015) Results. In: Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 2578 
(IHME), editor. Seattle, United States; 2016. 2579 
28. Liyanage P, Tissera H, Sewe M, et al. A Spatial Hierarchical Analysis of the Temporal 2580 
Influences of the El Nino-Southern Oscillation and Weather on Dengue in Kalutara District, 2581 
Sri Lanka. International journal of environmental research and public health 2016; 13(11). 2582 
29. Wilder-Smith A, Byass P. The elusive global burden of dengue. The Lancet Infectious 2583 
diseases 2016; 16(6): 629-31. 2584 
  93 
30. Mitchell D, Heaviside C, Vardoulakis S, et al. Attributing human mortality during 2585 
extreme heat waves to anthropogenic climate change. Environmental Research Letters 2586 
2016; 11(7): 074006. 2587 
31. Zanobetti A, Schwartz J. Temperature and mortality in nine US cities. Epidemiology 2588 
(Cambridge, Mass) 2008; 19(4): 563-70. 2589 
32. Gasparrini A, Guo Y, Hashizume M, et al. Temporal Variation in Heat-Mortality 2590 
Associations: A Multicountry Study. Environmental health perspectives 2015; 123(11): 1200-2591 
7. 2592 
33. Shi L, Kloog I, Zanobetti A, Liu P, Schwartz JD. Impacts of Temperature and its 2593 
Variability on Mortality in New England. Nature climate change 2015; 5: 988-91. 2594 
34. Guo Y, Gasparrini A, Armstrong BG, et al. Temperature Variability and Mortality: A 2595 
Multi-Country Study. Environmental health perspectives 2016. 2596 
35. Wang Y, Shi L, Zanobetti A, Schwartz JD. Estimating and projecting the effect of cold 2597 
waves on mortality in 209 US cities. Environment international 2016; 94: 141-9. 2598 
36. Murray CJL, et al. Disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) for 291 diseases and injuries 2599 
in 21 regions, 1990–2010: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2600 
2010. The Lancet 2013; 380(9859): 2197–223. 2601 
37. Dye C. After 2015: infectious diseases in a new era of health and development. Royal 2602 
Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society B 2014; 369(1645). 2603 
38. World Health Organization. Using climate to predict infectious disease epidemics. 2604 
Geneva, Switzerland, 2005. 2605 
39. World Health Organization. The Health and Environment Lexicon: Multi-Language 2606 
Glossary of Health and Environment Terminology. 2017. 2607 
http://apps.who.int/thelexicon/entry.php. 2608 
40. Stanaway JD, et al. The global burden of dengue: an analysis from the Global Burden 2609 
of Disease Study 2013. The Lancet: Infectious Diseases 2016; 16(6): 712–23. 2610 
41. Hales S, de Wet, N, Maindonald, J. and Woodward, A. Potential effect of population 2611 
and climate changes on global distribution of dengue fever: an empirical model. The Lancet 2612 
2002; 360(9336): 830-4. 2613 
42. Krishnamurthy PK, et al. A methodological framework for rapidly assessing the 2614 
impacts of climate risk on national-level food security through a vulnerability index. Global 2615 
Environmental Change 2014; 24: 121–32. 2616 
43. Nelson GC, Rosegrant MW, Palazzo A, et al. Food Security Farming and Climate 2617 
Change to 2050: scenarios, results, policy options: International Food Policy Research 2618 
Institute, 2010. 2619 
  94 
44. Schmidhuber J, Tubiello FN. Global food security under climate change. Proceedings 2620 
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 2007; 104(50): 19703-8. 2621 
45. Campbell-Lendrum D, Woodruff R. Comparative risk assessment of the burden of 2622 
disease from climate change. Environmental health perspectives 2006; 114: 1935–41. 2623 
46. Campbell-Lendrum DH, Corvalán CF, Prüss–Ustün A. How Much Disease Could 2624 
Climate Change Cause? Geneva: The World Health Organization, 2003. 2625 
47. Naylor RL, Falcon WP. Food security in an era of economic volatility. Population and 2626 
development review 2010; 36(4): 693-723. 2627 
48. Headey D, Fan S. Reflections on the global food crisis: how did it happen? how has it 2628 
hurt? and how can we prevent the next one?, 2010. 2629 
49. Asseng S, Ewert F, Martre P, et al. Rising temperatures reduce global wheat 2630 
production. Nature climate change 2015; 5(2): 143-7. 2631 
50. Peng S, Huang, J., Sheehy, J.E., Laza, R.C., Visperas, R.M., Zhong, X., Centeno, G.S., 2632 
Khush, G.S. and Cassman, K.G. Rice yields decline with higher night temperature from global 2633 
warming. Proceedings of the National academy of Sciences of the United States of America 2634 
2004; 101(27): 9971-5. 2635 
51. Lobell DB, Burke, M.B., Tebaldi, C., Mastrandrea, M.D., Falcon, W.P. and Naylor, R.L. 2636 
Prioritizing climate change adaptation needs for food security in 2030. Science 2007; 2637 
319(5863): 607-10. 2638 
52. Lobell DB, Schlenker, W. and Costa-Roberts, J. Climate trends and global crop 2639 
production since 1980. Science 2011; 333(6042): 616-20. 2640 
53. Gornall J, et al. Implications of climate change for agricultural productivity in the 2641 
early twenty-first century. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological 2642 
Sciences 2010; 365(1554). 2643 
54. FAO. The FAO Hunger Map 2015. In: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 2644 
Nations, editor.; 2015. 2645 
55. Jones PG, Thornton PK. The potential impacts of climate change on maize production 2646 
in Africa and Latin America in 2055. Global Environmental Change 2003; 13(1): 51-9. 2647 
56. Lobell DB, Bänziger M, Magorokosho C, Vivek B. Nonlinear heat effects on African 2648 
maize as evidenced by historical yield trials. Nature climate change 2011; 1(1): 42-5. 2649 
57. High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition of the Committee on 2650 
World Food Security. Sustainable Fisheries and Aquaculture for Food Security and Nutrition. 2651 
Rome, Italy, 2014. 2652 
58. World Health Organization. Availability and consumption of fish. 2017. 2653 
http://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/3_foodconsumption/en/index5.html (accessed July 2654 
2017. 2655 
  95 
59. Djouse L, et al. Fish consumption, omega-3 fatty acids and risk of heart failure: a 2656 
meta-analysis. Clinical Nutrition 2012; 31(6): 846-53. 2657 
60. Golden Cea. Fall in fish catch threatens human health. Nature 2016; 534(317). 2658 
61. Bushaw-Newton KL, Sellner KG. Harmful Algal Blooms: National Oceanic and 2659 
Atmospheric Administration, 1999. 2660 
62. Armstrong EM, Vazquez-Cuervo J. A  New  Global  Satellite-Based  Sea  Surface 2661 
Temperature Climatology. Geophysical Research Letters 2001; 28(22): 4199-202. 2662 
63. International Organization for Migration. Migration and Climate Change, 2008. 2663 
64. Gleick PH. Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria. American 2664 
Meteorological Society 2014. 2665 
65. Kelley CP, Mohtadib S, Canec MA, Seagerc R, Kushnirc Y. Climate change in the 2666 
Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought. Proceedings of the National 2667 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 2015; 112(11): 3241–6. 2668 
66. McMichael C, Barnett J, McMichael AJ. An Ill Wind? Climate Change, Migration, and 2669 
Health. Environmental health perspectives 2012; 120(5): 646-54. 2670 
67. Green M. Contested territory. Nature climate change 2016; 6: 817–20. 2671 
68. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Fiji: Building 2672 
resilience in the face of climate change, 2014. 2673 
69. EU-GIZ Adapting to Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Programme. Planned 2674 
Relocation Project. 2017. 2675 
70. Connell J. Last  days  in  the  Carteret  Islands?  Climate change,  livelihoods  and 2676 
migration on coral atolls. Asia Pacific Viewpoint 2016; 57(1): 3-15. 2677 
71. Strauss S. Are cultures endangered by climate change? Yes, but ... WIREs Climate 2678 
Change 2012; 3(4): 371-7. 2679 
72. Bronen R, Chapin I. Adaptive  governance and  institutional  strategies  for climate-2680 
induced community relocations  in  Alaska. PNAS, Proceedings of the National Academy of 2681 
Sciences 2013; 110(23): 9320-5. 2682 
73. Shearer C. The  political  ecology  of  climate  adaptation  assistance:  Alaska  Natives, 2683 
displacement, and relocation. Journal of Political Ecology 2012; 19: 174-83. 2684 
74. Small C, Nicholls RJ. A  Global  Analysis  of  Human  Settlement  in  Coastal Zones. 2685 
Journal of Coastal Research 2003; 19(3): 584-99. 2686 
75. McGranahan G, Balk, D. and Anderson, B. The  rising  tide:  assessing  the  risks  of 2687 
climate  change  and  human  settlements  in  low  elevation coastal  zones. Environment  & 2688 
Urbanization 2007; 19(1): 17-37. 2689 
  96 
76. Merkens JL, Reimann, L, Hinkel, J. and Vafeidis, A.T. Gridded  population projections 2690 
for the coastal zone under the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways. Global and Planetary 2691 
Change 2016; 145: 57-66. 2692 
77. Gregory J. Projections of sea level rise: Working Group I contribution to the IPCC 2693 
Fifth Assessment Report - Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis, 2013. 2694 
78. Collins PY, et al. Grand challenges in global mental health: A consortium of 2695 
researchers, advocates and clinicians announces here research priorities for improving the 2696 
lives of people with mental illness around the world, and calls for urgent action and 2697 
investment. Nature 2011; 475: 27-30. 2698 
79. Vins H, Bell J, Saha S, Hess J. The mental health outcomes of drought: A systematic 2699 
review and causal process diagram. International journal of environmental research and 2700 
public health 2015; 12: 13251. 2701 
80. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Climate Change 2007: Working Group 2702 
II: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, 2001. 2703 
81. Rockerfeller Foundation. Resilience. 2017. 2704 
https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/our-work/topics/resilience/ (accessed 02 Jul 2017). 2705 
82. United Nations Framework Convention on Change. National Adaptation Plans. 2017. 2706 
83. World Health Organization. WHO guidance to protect health from climate change 2707 
through health adaptation planning. Switzerland, 2014. 2708 
84. World Health Organization. Operational framework for building climate resilient 2709 
health systems. Geneva, Switzerland, 2015. 2710 
85. United Nations. The World's Cities in 2016, 2016. 2711 
86. Doherty M, Klima K, Hellmann JJ. Climate change in the urban environment: 2712 
Advancing, measuring and achieving resiliency. Environmental Science & Policy 2016; 66: 2713 
310-3. 2714 
87. Compact of Mayors. 2017. https://www.compactofmayors.org/. 2715 
88. Carbon Disclosure Project. Carbon Disclosure Project Data. 2017. 2716 
89. Carbon Disclosure Project. CDP Cities 2016 Information Request, 2016. 2717 
90. Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform. Sustainable Development Goal 3 - 2718 
Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages. 2017. 2719 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg3. 2720 
91. World Health Organization. International Health Regulations (2005) Second Edition, 2721 
2008. 2722 
92. World Health Assembly. World Health Assembly resolution WHA 62.1 2008. 2723 
  97 
93. International Health Regulations. IHR Core Capacity Monitoring Framework: 2724 
Questionnaire for monitoring progress in the implementation of IHR core capacities in states 2725 
parties: World Health Organization, 2005. 2726 
94. World Health Organization. International Health Regulations (2005). IHR Core 2727 
Capacity Monitoring Framework: Questionnaire for Monitoring Progress in the 2728 
Implementation of IHR Core Capacities in States Parties, 2017. 2729 
95. World Meteorological Organization. Monitoring and Evaluation. 2017. 2730 
96. World Health Organization. Protecting Health from Climate Change: Vulnerability 2731 
and Adaptation Assessment, 2013. 2732 
97. Lim SS, Allen K, Bhutta ZA, et al. Measuring the health-related Sustainable 2733 
Development Goals in 188 countries: a baseline analysis from the Global Burden of Disease 2734 
Study 2015. The Lancet 2016; 16: 31467-2. 2735 
98. Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment. National Energy and Climate Strategy. 2736 
In: Government of Finland, editor.; 2016. 2737 
99. Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy. Coal Generation in Great 2738 
Britain. The pathway to a low-carbon future: consultation document In: HM Government, 2739 
editor.; 2016. 2740 
100. Mason J. In latest move, China halts over 100 coal power projects. 2017. 2741 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-china-coal-idUKKBN151090 (accessed July 2017. 2742 
101. UBS. UBS Evidence Lab Electric Car Teardown – Disruption Ahead?, 2017. 2743 
102. International Energy Agency. Medium-Term Renewable Energy Market Report 2016, 2744 
2016. 2745 
103. Dezem V. Solar Sold in Chile at Lowest Ever, Half Price of Coal. 2016. 2746 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-19/solar-sells-in-chile-for-cheapest-2747 
ever-at-half-the-price-of-coal. 2748 
104. Le Quéré C, Andrew, R.M, Canadell, J.G, et al. Global Carbon Budget 2016. Earth 2749 
System Science Data 2016; 8: 605-49. 2750 
105. Schirnding YV. Framework for Linkages between Health, Environment and 2751 
Development, 2002. 2752 
106. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of 2753 
Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment 2754 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge, United Kingdom and 2755 
New York, NY, USA, 2014. 2756 
107. International Energy Agency. Energy and Climate Change, 2015. 2757 
  98 
108. Rogelj J, Schaeffer, M, Meinshausen, M, et al. Zero emission targets as long-term 2758 
global goals for climate protection. Environmental Research Letters 2015; 10(105007). 2759 
109. Pye S, Li FGN, Price J, Fais B. Achieving net-zero emissions through the reframing of 2760 
UK national targets in the post-Paris Agreement era. Nature Energy 2017; 2. 2761 
110. Rockström J, Gaffney, O, Rogelj, J, Meinshausen, M, Nakicenovic, N. and 2762 
Schellnhuber, H.J. A roadmap for rapid decarbonization. Science 2017; 80(355): 1269–71. 2763 
111. International Energy Agency. World Energy Outlook. Paris, France, 2016. 2764 
112. International Energy Agency. Energy and Air Pollution: World Energy Outlook Special 2765 
Report. Paris, France, 2016. 2766 
113. Green F, Stern N. China’s changing economy: implications for its carbon dioxide 2767 
emissions. Climate Policy 2017; 17: 423–42. 2768 
114. Shearer C, Ghio, N, Myllyvirta, L, Yu, A. and Nace, T. Boom and Bust 2017 - Tracking 2769 
the global coal plant pipeline, 2017. 2770 
115. IRENA. Conference on the establishment of the international renewable energy 2771 
agency. Bonn, Germany, 2009. 2772 
116. World Health Organization. The European health report 2015: Targets and beyond – 2773 
reaching new frontiers in evidence, 2015. 2774 
117. World Health Organization. Proportion of population with primary reliance on clean 2775 
fuels and technology. Geneva, Switzerland, 2017. 2776 
118. International Energy Agency, World Bank. Sustainable Energy for All 2017—Progress 2777 
toward Sustainable Energy. Washington, D.C., 2017. 2778 
119. World Energy Oulook. WEO 2016 Biomass Database. 2016. 2779 
120. World Energy Outlook. WEO 2016 Electricity Access Database. 2016. 2780 
121. World Health Organization. Household Fuel Combustion: WHO guidelines for indoor 2781 
air quality, 2014. 2782 
122. Bonjour S, Adair-Rohani, H, Wolf, J. et al. Solid Fuel Use for Household Cooking: 2783 
Country and Regional Estimates for 1980–2010. Environmental health perspectives 2013; 2784 
121: 784–90. 2785 
123. West JJ, Smith, S.J, Silva, R.A. et al. Co-benefits of Global Greenhouse Gas Mitigation 2786 
for Future Air Quality and Human Health. Nature climate change 2013; 3: 885–9. 2787 
124. Institute for Health Metrics and Global Burden of Disease. State of Global Air - 2017: 2788 
A special report on global exposure to air pollution and its disease burden, 2017. 2789 
  99 
125. World Health Organization. WHO’s Urban Ambient Air Pollution database – Update 2790 
2016. Geneva, Switzerland, 2017. 2791 
126. Milner J, Taylor, J, Barreto, M.L. et al. Environmental risks of cities in the European 2792 
region: analyses of the Sustainable Healthy Urban Environments (SHUE) database. Public 2793 
Health Panorama 2017; 3: 300-9. 2794 
127. World Health Organization. Air pollution levels rising in many of the world’s poorest 2795 
cities, 2016. 2796 
128. European Commission. Europe, Latin America and The Caribbean: sharing 2797 
experiences in regional development policies, 2015. 2798 
129. Instituto Nacional de Estadistica e Informatica. 2017. 2799 
130. Fondo De Inclusion Social Energetico. Memoria Anual De Gestion Fise 2015, 2015. 2800 
131. Fondo De Inclusion Social Energetico. Memoria Anual De Gestion Fise 2014, 2014. 2801 
132. European Commission. Directive 2001/80/EC of the European Parliament and of the 2802 
Council on the limitation of emissions of certain pollutants into the air from large 2803 
combustion plants. OJEC L 309/1. 2001. 2804 
133. EU Parliament and Council. Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of 2805 
the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention 2806 
and control). OJEC L 334/17. 2010. 2807 
134. Pope CAea. Lung Cancer, Cardiopulmonary Mortality and Long-Term Exposure to 2808 
Fine Particulate Air Pollution. Journal of the American Medical Association 2002; 287 (9): 2809 
1132–41. 2810 
135. Lim SSea. A Comparative Risk Assessment of Burden of Disease and Injury 2811 
Attributable to 67 Risk Factors and Risk Factor Clusters in 21 Regions, 1990–2010: A 2812 
Systematic Analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2010. The Lancet 2012; 2813 
380(9859): 2224–60. 2814 
136. Forouzanfar MHea. Global, Regional, and National Comparative Risk Assessment of 2815 
79 Behavioural, Environmental and Occupational, and Metabolic Risks or Clusters of Risks in 2816 
188 Countries, 1990–2013: A Systematic Analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2817 
2013. The Lancet 2015; 386(10010): 2287–323. 2818 
137. World Health Organization. Ambient Air Pollution: A Global Assessment of Exposure 2819 
and Burden of Disease. Geneva, Switzerland, 2016. 2820 
138. Amann M, I. Bertok, J. Borken-Kleefeld, J. Cofala, C. Heyes, L. Höglund-Isaksson, Z. 2821 
Klimont, et al. Cost-Effective Control of Air Quality and Greenhouse Gases in Europe: 2822 
Modeling and Policy Applications. Environmental Modelling & Software 2011; 26(2): 1489–2823 
501. 2824 
139. International Energy Agency. Energy Technology Perspectives. Paris, France, 2016. 2825 
  100 
140. International Energy Agency. Global EV Outlook 2016: Beyond on million electric 2826 
cars. Paris, France, 2016. 2827 
141. International Energy Agency. Global EV Outlook 2017: Two Million and Counting, 2828 
2017. 2829 
142. Electric Vehicle Initiative. Global Electric Vehicle Outlook. 2016. 2830 
143. Land Transport Authority. Passenger Transport Mode Shares in World Cities, 2014. 2831 
144. Salon D, Gulyani S. Mobility, Poverty, and Gender: Travel ‘Choices’ of Slum Residents 2832 
in Nairobi, Kenya. Transport Reviews 2010; 30: 641–57. 2833 
145. Sims R. RS, F. Creutzig, X. Cruz-Núñez, M. D’Agosto, D. Dimitriu, M.J. Figueroa Meza, 2834 
L. Fulton, S., Kobayashi, O. Lah, A. McKinnon, P. Newman, M. Ouyang, J.J. Schauer, D. 2835 
Sperling, and G. Tiwari. Transport, 2014. 2836 
146. United Nations Environment Program. Global Outlook on Walking and Cycling: 2837 
United Nations, 2016. 2838 
147. Institute for Mobility Research. Mobility trends in cutting edge cities, 2016. 2839 
148. Transport for London. Travel in London Report 9, 2016. 2840 
149. NSW Department of Transport. Public transport travel patterns in the greater Sydney 2841 
Metropolitan area 1981-1991. 1996. 2842 
150. NSW Department of Transport. Household Travel Survey Summary Report 2002. 2843 
2003. 2844 
151. NSW Department of Transport. Household Travel Survey Summary Report 2007. 2845 
2009. 2846 
152. NSW Department of Transport. Key Transport Indicators- How do people travel. 2847 
2017. 2848 
153. Translink. Metro Vancouver Regional Trip Diary Survey Briefing Paper #1. 2012. 2849 
154. S.A. D. Estudio Encuesta origen destino de viajes del Gran Santiago, 1991, 1992. 2850 
155. Rode P, Hoffmann C, Kandt J, Smith D, Graff A. Toward New Urban. Mobility: The 2851 
case of London and Berlin. London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2015. 2852 
156. City of Berlin. Mobility in the City: Berlin Traffic in Figures, 2013. 2853 
157. Vermeulen SJ, Campbell BM, Ingram JSI. Climate change and food systems. Annual 2854 
Review of Environment and Resources 2012; 37: 195-222. 2855 
158. Lim SS, Vos, T, Flaxman, A.D. et al. Global, regional, and national comparative risk 2856 
assessment of 79 behavioural, environmental and occupational, and metabolic risks or 2857 
  101 
clusters of risks in 188 countries, 1990-2013: a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of 2858 
Disease Study 2013. The Lancet 2016; 380: 2224–60. 2859 
159. Springmann Mea. Analysis and valuation of the health and climate change cobenefits 2860 
of dietary change. PNAS, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 2016; 15: 4146-2861 
51. 2862 
160. Hawkesworth S, Dangour, A.D, Johnston, D. et al. Feeding the world healthily: the 2863 
challenge of measuring the effects of agriculture on health. Philosophical Transactions of the 2864 
Royal Society B Biological Sciences 2010; 365: 3083–97. 2865 
161. Smith MR, Micha, R, Golden, C.D. et al. Global Expanded Nutrient Supply (GENuS) 2866 
Model: A New Method for Estimating the Global Dietary Supply of Nutrients. PLoS One 2867 
2016; 11. 2868 
162. Gobbo LCD, Khatibzadeh, S, Imamura, F. et al. Assessing global dietary habits : a 2869 
comparison of national estimates from the FAO and the Global Dietary Database 1 – 4, 2870 
2015. 2871 
163. Herrero Mea. Greenhouse gas mitigation potentials in the livestock sector. Nature 2872 
climate change 2016; 6: 452–61. 2873 
164. O’Mara FP. The significance of livestock as a contributor to global greenhouse gas 2874 
emissions today and in the near future. Animal Feed Science and Technology 2011; 166–167: 2875 
7–15. 2876 
165. Herrero M, Havlík P, Valin H, et al. Biomass use, production, feed efficiencies, and 2877 
greenhouse gas emissions from global livestock systems. Proceedings of the National 2878 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 2013; 110: 20888–93. 2879 
166. Carlsson-Kanyama A, González AD. Potential contributions of food consumption 2880 
patterns to climate change. American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 2009; 89: 1704S–9S. 2881 
167. Larsson SC, Wolk A. Meat consumption and risk of colorectal cancer: A meta-analysis 2882 
of prospective studies. International Journal of Cancer 2006; 119: 2657–64. 2883 
168. Norat T, Lukanova, A, Ferrari, P. and Riboli, E. Meat consumption and colorectal 2884 
cancer risk: Dose-response meta-analysis of epidemiological studies. International Journal of 2885 
Cancer; 98: 241–56. 2886 
169. FAOSTAT. Food Balance Sheets, 2017. 2887 
170. Ng M, Fleming T, Robinson M, al. e. Global, regional, and national prevalence of 2888 
overweight and obesity in children and adults during 1980-2013: A systematic analysis for 2889 
the Global Burden of Disease Study 2013. The Lancet 2013; 384: 766–81. 2890 
171. World Bank. Climate-Smart Healthcare: Low-Carbon and Resilience Strategies for the 2891 
Health Sector. Washington DC, 2017. 2892 
172. NHS Sustainable Development Unit. NHS carbon footprint, 2016. 2893 
  102 
173. Stern N. Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change. In: Kingdom GotU, 2894 
editor. London: Blackwell Publishing; 2006. p. 5. 2895 
174. Weitzmann. M. Fat-Tailed Uncertainty in the Economics of Catastrophic Climate 2896 
Change. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 2011; 5(2): 17. 2897 
175. Stern N. The Structure of Economic Modeling of the Potential Impacts of Climate 2898 
Change: Grafting Gross Underestimation of Risk onto Already Narrow Science Models. 2899 
Journal of Economic Literature 2013; 51(3): 21. 2900 
176. International Energy Agency. World Energy Investment 2016. Paris, 2016. 2901 
177. International Energy Agency. World Energy Investment 2017. Paris, 2017. 2902 
178. International Energy Agency. World Energy Outlook 2016. Paris, France, 2016. 2903 
179. International Energy Agency, International Renewable Energy Agency. Perspectives 2904 
for the energy transition: Investment needs for a low-carbon energy system. Berlin, 2905 
Germany, 2017. 2906 
180. Olivier JGJ, Janssens-Maenhout G, Muntean M, Peters JAHW. Trends in Global CO2 2907 
Emissions: 2016 Report: PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, The Hague, 2908 
2016. 2909 
181. Ansar A, Caldecott B, Tilbury J. Stranded assets and the fossil fuel divestment 2910 
campaign: what does divestment mean for the valuation of fossil fuel assets?: Smith School 2911 
of Enterprise and the Environment, 2013. 2912 
182. North CS. Disaster Mental Health Epidemiology: Methodological Review and 2913 
Interpretation of Research Findings. Psychiatry 2016; 79(2): 16. 2914 
183. Munich Re. NatCatSERVICE. In: Re M, editor.; 2017. 2915 
184. World Health Organization. Global Health Observatory (GHO) data. In: World Health 2916 
Organization, editor. Geneva; 2017. 2917 
185. Ming-Xiao. W, Tao. Z, Miao-Rong. X, Bin. Z, Ming-Qiu. J. Analysis Of National Coal-2918 
mining Accident data In China, 2001–2008. Public Health Rep 2011; 126(2): 5. 2919 
186. Hendryx M, Ahern MM. Relations Between Health Indicators and Residential 2920 
Proximity to Coal Mining in West Virginia. American Journal of Public Health 2008; 98(4): 2. 2921 
187. Zullig. KJ, Hendryx. M. A Comparative Analysis of Health-Related Quality of Life for 2922 
Residents of U.S. Counties with and without Coal Mining. Public Health Reports 2010; 2923 
125(4): 7. 2924 
188. Hendryx M. Mortality from heart, respiratory, and kidney disease in coal mining 2925 
areas of Appalachia. International Archives of Occupational and Environmental Health 2009; 2926 
82(2): 6. 2927 
  103 
189. IBIS World. Global Coal Mining: Market Research Report, 2016. 2928 
190. IBIS World. Global Oil & Gas Exploration & Production: Market Research Report, 2929 
2017. 2930 
191. IRENA. Renewable Energy and Jobs: Annual Review 2017. Abu Dhabi: International 2931 
Renewable Energy Agency, 2017. 2932 
192. International Energy Agency. World Energy Outlook 2012. Paris, France, 2012. 2933 
193. Granado JA, Coady D, Gillingham R. The Unequal Benefits of Fuel Subsidies: A Review 2934 
of Evidence for Developing Countries, 2010. 2935 
194. General Secretariat of the Council. G7 Ise-Shima Leaders' Declaration. Brussels, 2936 
Blegium; 2016. p. 1. 2937 
195. World Bank. Carbon Pricing Dashboard. 2017. 2938 
http://carbonpricingdashboard.worldbank.org (accessed 06.06.2017 2017). 2939 
196. World Bank, Ecofys. Carbon Pricing Watch 2017. Washington DC, USA, 2017. 2940 
197. Patuelli R, Nijkamp P, Pels E. Environmental tax reform and the double dividend: a 2941 
meta-analytical performance assessment. Ecological Economics 2005; 55: 564-83. 2942 
198. Georgeson L, al. e. Global Disparity in the Supply of Commercial Weather and 2943 
Climate Information Services. Science Advances 2017; 3(5). 2944 
199. Climate Funds Update. Climate Funds Update: The Data. 2017. 2945 
http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/. 2946 
200. Crompton T. Common Values: The Case for Working with our Cultural Values: WWF, 2947 
2010. 2948 
201. World Health Assembly. Sixty-first World Health Assembly WHA61.19. 2008. 2949 
202. Boykoff MT, Goodman MK, Curtis I. Cultural Politics of Climate Change: Interactions 2950 
in Everyday Spaces, 2009. 2951 
203. Lee TM, Markowitz EM, Howe PD, al e. Predictors of public climate change 2952 
awareness and risk perception around the world Nature climate change 2015; 5: 1014–20. 2953 
204. Boykoff MT. Media and scientific communication: a case of climate change 2954 
Geological Society 2008; 305: 11-8. 2955 
205. Steentjes K, al e. European Perceptions of Climate Change: Topline findings of a 2956 
survey conducted in four European countries in 2016, 2017. 2957 
206. Billett S. Dividing climate change: global warming in the Indian mass media. Climatic 2958 
Change 2010; 99(1/2): 525-37. 2959 
  104 
207. Bhatta SNA. Coverage of Climate Change Issues in Indian Newspapers and Policy 2960 
Implications. Current Science 2015; 108(11): 1972-3. 2961 
208. Andrews K, Boykoff, M., Daly, M., Gifford, L., Luedecke, G., McAllister, L., and Nacu-2962 
Schmidt, A. . World Newspaper Coverage of Climate Change or Global Warming, 2004-2017: 2963 
Center for Science and Technology Policy Research, Cooperative Institute for Research in 2964 
Environmental Sciences, University of Colorado, 2017. 2965 
209. Schütte S, Depoux A, Vigil S, al. e. The influence of health concerns in scientific and 2966 
policy debates on climate change. 2015; Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health. 2967 
210. Depoux A, Hémono M, Puig-Malet S, Pédron R, Flahault A. Communicating climate 2968 
change and health in the media. Public Health Reviews 2017; 38(1): 7. 2969 
211. Hosking J, Campbell-Lendrum D. How well does climate change and human health 2970 
research match the demands of policymakers? A scoping review. Environmental health 2971 
perspectives 2012; 120(8): 1076-82. 2972 
212. Campbell-Lendrum D, Bertollini R, Neira M, Ebi K, McMichael A. Health and climate 2973 
change: a roadmap for applied research. The Lancet 2009; 373(9676): 1663-5. 2974 
213. Arksey H, O’Malley L. Scoping studies: towards a methodological framework. 2975 
International Journal of Social Research Methodology 2005; 8(1): 19-32. 2976 
214. Janssen MA, Schoon, M.L, Ke, W, and Börner, K. Scholarly networks on resilience, 2977 
vulnerability and adaptation within the human dimensions of global environmental change. 2978 
Global Environmental Change 2006; 16(3): 240-52. 2979 
215. Herlihy N, Bar-Hen A, Verner G, et al. Climate change and human health: what are 2980 
the research trends? A scoping review protocol. British Medical Journal 2016; 6. 2981 
216. Baturo A, Dasandi N, Mikhaylov S. Understanding State Preferences with Text as 2982 
Data: Introducing the UN General Debate Corpus. Research and Politics 2017; 4(2). 2983 
 2984 
